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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an analysis of the role of credit in the changing
structures of successful informal -sector manufacturing firms and their
relationships with buyers and sel lers in the rest of the economy.
Twenty-four firmowners, clients of the Association for the Development
of Microenterprises, Inc. (ADEMI), were interviewed in-depth in Santo
Domingo, Dominican Republic over a period of one and a half months. A
firm's changing needs for labor, its different sources of supply, the
different markets for its products and its ability to 'graduate' to
commercial bank credit are analyzed over time as the firm grows.
Three stages of development of a microfirm are then identified based
upon these findings.
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INTRODUCTION
The debate on urban employment problems in developing countries
has recently focused upon the role of small-scale enterprises in
providing earning opportunities for a growing proportion of these
countries' populations. These activities have flourished into what is
defined today as the "informal" sector of an economy. The literature
frequently depicts self-employment in this sector as the only
alternative left to persons with few resources and little or no formal
education. People engaged in such activities are all assumed to be
poor and to face the choice of either being unemployed or scratching
up a living by setting up a business. Very few success stories are
investigated or reported so that assumptions such as these are rarely
challenged.
Part of the reason why such generalizations are made is due to
the difficulty of researching these activities because most of them
are not officially registered. It is not surprising that opinions
vary widely over the growth potential of these informal small-scale
firms and thus on which policies (credit or technical assistance
programs, for example) are most suitable for aiding them. As will
become clear in this paper, the success stories can teach us many
things about the growth potential of informal sector firms and on how
to improve the chances of others to succeed.
This study examines the role of a credit program in the changing
structure of successful informal sector manufacturing microfirms and
their relationships with other firms in the rest of the economy. The
study focuses specifically upon the changes a microfirm experiences in
the structure of its labor force and in its links with buyers and
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sellers. It intends to provide insight into how the owners of
successful microenterprises approach different stages of growth, how
they overcome various bottlenecks at each stage, and how they view
their positions in relation to other organizations in the economy.
The role of a credit program at each of these stages of development is
also analyzed from the points of view of these microentrepreneurs.
The credit program chosen for the study is ADEMI* which is
located in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. Twenty-four
manufacturing firms were interviewed in-depth over a period of one and
a half months. Interviews were also conducted with bankers and
officials of other credit programs in the area. The field research
was funded through a Masters Fellowship awarded to the author by the
Inter-American Foundation. However, the views presented here are not
those of the Foundation.
The Sample
The findings are based upon twenty-four manufacturing firms which
were selected arbitrarily from among 41 of ADEMI's "most successful"
clients. These firms were in clothing and shoe manufacture, candle
manufacture, jewelry, refrigeration repair, mattress repair,
ceramics, printing, bread production, and sweets production. Table A-
1 compares some characteristics of these firms with those of firms
used in a feasibil ity study carried out in 1980 in which a sample of
200 microenterprises in manufacturing and services was taken in Santo
Domingo.
Association for the Development of Microenterprises, Inc.
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Using ADEMI's standards, a successful firm is one which meets one
of the fol lowing criteria: 1) the business has grown to where it is
eligible for the largest loans offered by the program (RD$5000 or
US$1500); 2) it receives credit from other institutions while
receiving credit from ADEMI; 3) it is currently on the list "a
graduar" (to graduate) to the Investment Fund for Economic Development
(FIDE), a program within the Central Bank which finances smal 1
industries with fixed capital assets between RD$10,000 and RD$100,000.
Firms which had grown were chosen in an effort to assess their
patterns of growth and how these have changed over time. Because they
have succeeded in staying around for a while, they provide a unique
understanding of the different relationships and/or links they form
with buyers and sellers and how these also change over time.
The reader should keep in mind as he or she goes through the
paper that the findings are based upon manufacturing firms which have
succeeded in growing. The experiences of firms which have not grown
would probably present a rather different picture. Owners had very
few negative comments about the ADEMI credit program, for example.
This is not surprising when you think that they never received an
unfriendly visit from ADEMI's assessors or the sheriff because they
had excellent repayment records. Because the sample limits itself to
manufacturing firms exclusively, the experiences of these firmowners
should not be interpreted as those of successful firms invol ved in
commerce or nonproduction-related activities.
In addition, no control group was formed so the paper makes no
attempt to claim statistically that credit is a causal factor behind
growth. In this case, there is no evidence to show that these firms
would not have grown the way they did without credit, or that this
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growth was not caused by other factors. Instead, the discussion
concentrates on showing how the ADEMI credit program has influenced
(not caused) changes in the development of these firms. Data on
variables such as the size of labor force, the value of fixed capital,
and monthly wage bills, materials used, and sales, were gathered from
ADEMI files to complement some of the empirical findings. A brief
analysis of these is provided in Appendix A.
Credit: The ADEMI Program
By far the largest component of assistance from donor agencies
and local institutions in developing countries to informal-sector
businesses has been the provision of loans. The main objectives of
these programs are to give informal sector firms access to finance
they can afford and enable them to build up a credit history so they
can eventually be deemed worthy risks by commercial lenders .
ADEMI is a private, non-profit institution which was organized by
the private sector in the Dominican Republic in response to problems
of unemployment and underemployment in the country. It began
operating in April 1983 with suppport from publ ic sector and
international organizations. The most successful elements among
programs in Indonesia (BKK), the Dominican Republic (Dominican
Development Foundation), and El Salvador (FEDICCREDITO) were combined
to form the ADEMI program. Thus, ADEMI is characterized by the
minimal paperwork required, the rapidity with which loans are approved
and disbursed (from one day to another), its ability to reach large
numbers of clients because of its efficient bureaucracy, no collateral
requirement, and reasonable interest rates compared to those charged
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by moneylenders. Most other programs lend at subsidized rates for
long periods. This has frequently resulted in bad records of
repayment among borrowers. ADEMI currently has a 92% repayment rate,
an accomplishment rarely seen in the world of credit extension
programs.
The study is broken into five chapters. The first examines the
role of labor in the development process of successful informal-sector
manufacturing firms, and the effect of credit programs on that
process. The second is devoted to a discussion of linkages with input
suppliers and how these change with the extension of credit. The
third chapter discusses existing and potential markets for these
informal sector firms. Chapter four examines the process of a firm's
'graduation' from the ADEMI program, with particular focus upon the
ability to obtain loans from commercial banks. Finally, chapter five
distinguishes three stages of development and examines the influences
of credit at each stage. A summary of the findings is provided at the
end of the paper.
The Concept of the Informal Sector
The informal-sector concept has emerged from discussions
regarding the observed dualistic nature of developing economies and
the growing concern over the unemployment problem. Two sectors in the
economy can be distinguished: the formal sector which includes
activities based on modern modes of production and organization, and
the informal sector which has been defined by the ILO as "a way of
doing things characterized by ease of entry, rel iance on indigenous
resources, family ownership of enterprises, small scale of operation,
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labor-intensive and adapted technology, skills acquired outside the
formal school system, and unregulated and competitive markets."
The merits and drawbacks regarding the distribution between two
sectors and the ILO's definition of what constitutes an informal
sector activity have been discussed in the literature for almost a
decade now. While there is general agreement that developing
economies do exhibit a tendency toward dualism, there is substantial
debate over how separate these two sectors really are and therefore
over how different the growth path of an informal sector business is
compared to that of one in the formal sector. One criticism questions
the validity of separating the economy into a formal and informal
sector because it implies that there are no links between the two
(Moser, 1978). Another criticism is that economic activities exist in
a continuum and that these can be divided into many different sectors,
not only two (Standing, 1977). It questions the bases used for the
dual distinction. A third criticism is that the two-sector economy is
a temporary phenomenon; an informal sector business is in transition
toward becoming a formal sector business (Emmerij, 1974).
All three criticisms have one thing in common: they all question
the nature of the relationships among firms, be they small or large,
informal or formal. Empirical studies have attempted to shed light on
this question by analyzing the various growth constraints facing
informal sector firms. Schmitz (1982) divides the studies of
manufacturing firms into two categories: those emphasizing external
factors and those emphasizing internal factors. The first group of
studies concludes that a microfirm's inability to grow is a
consequence of its lack of access to modern technology, raw materials
at lower formal sector prices, credit from formal sector banks, formal
13
sector product markets, and so on. The second group emphasizes that a
firm's growth is stunted by the lack of entrepreneurial or managerial
skills. Within each group there is disagreement over how "removable"
or "dissolvable" these constraints or bottlenecks are and from this
disagreement stems the debate over whether the growth of the informal
sector will be "involutionary" or "evolutionary".
"Involutionary" growth means that employment in the informal
sector will not lead to increasing incomes for workers and, therefore,
the sector will not grow beyong its present markets. Those supporting
this view argue that informal sector firms are unable to accumulate
surpluses because they are subordinated by formal sector institutions,
who crowd out their markets and monopolize their sources of raw
materials, thereby squeezing these firms' profits to the point where
there are none (Hart, 1970; Oshima, 1971). On the other hand, those
who hold the view that the growth of the informal sector will be
"evolutionary", say that informal sector firms can grow provided that
the policy environment is favorable and that their growth is a result
of greater linkages with formal sector firms (Mazumdar, 1976; ILO,
1972, Sethuraman, 1976).
The latter view provides a forum for discussions about how
informal sector firms can be assisted. Those emphasizing internal
constraints see the acquisition of technical and managerial skills as
of primary importance. Those emphasizing external constraints tend to
concentrate more on access to technology, raw materials, and credit as
policies to lift these firms out of poverty. In practice,
combinations of the two form present policies toward the informal
sector. The best examples are credit extension programs which provide
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a firm with financing and technical assistance, combined.
By contrast, the "involutionary" growth view leaves little room
for policy formulation for direct assistance since the mechanisms
through which informal sector businesses can accumulate surplus are
not determined within the formal sector of a developing country but by
industrialized economies. This view implies that a substantial change
in the prevailing international and national economic order will be
required to assist the informal sector (Tokman, 1978).
This study implicitly falls within the first group of Schmitz's
two categories in that it focuses upon external constraints primarily.
However, it lends support to the view that informal sector growth is
"evolutionary" by showing how some manufacturing firms are able to
"dissolve" or "remove" these external bottlenecks.
Contrary to the hypothesis that self-employment in the informal
sector will not lead to increasing incomes, this study finds that
these successful firmowners left jobs, both informal and formal, to
establish their business. It also finds that buying from and selling
to larger formal-sector firms does not automatically mean the latter
exploit the microfirm but rather that both parties develop
relationships to their mutual satisfaction. The entrepreneurs in this
study were able to exploit a situation efficiently and, in fact,
actively sought out relationships with the larger buyers and sellers
as a growth strategy. The view that informal sector growth is
"involutionary" is that firms are unable to accumulate surplus, i.e.,
grow because of informal sector institutions.
In addition, the findings in this study tend to support the three
criticisms of the informal-formal sector analytical division outlined
above. First, it clearly shows that there are definite links between
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institutions in both sectors supporting the criticism which questions
the validity of the separation.
Second, it shows how difficult it is to distinguish between
economic activities on the basis of whether they are informal or
formal. To cite just one example, many firms were not registered but
they observed the labor laws. The first would define them as informal
while the second would define them as formal. This, and many more
examples, support the view that economic activities exist in a
continuum.
It clearly supports the third criticism that an informal sector
business is in transition toward becoming a formal sector business and
that, therefore, the two-sector economy is a temporary phenomenon. As
these successful firms grew, the incentive to legalize grew, they
accumulated more capital , they began requiring more skilled labor,
they began relying upon imported raw materials, and they began selling
to the more "exclusive" markets of the rich. These characteristics
are usually attributed to formal sector firms.
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CHAPTER ONE: LABOR
Various studies have estimated that anywhere from 20 to 70
percent of the labor force is engaged in informal-sector activities.
In the case of the Dominican Republic, 50 percent of the labor force
in thought to be employed in the informal sector. While these
estimates are useful to policymakers, very few studies have looked at
the conditions under which this labor is absorbed and at the
opportunities facing people in this sector. As a result, general
assumptions are made about why and how people become self-employed.
This chapter discusses the experiences that successful microfirm
owners had in getting to where they are tod-ay. It also looks at how
an owner views apprentices, how he chooses them, and what their
opportunities for upward mobility are within the firm. In addition,
the chapter shows how a firm's need for labor changes over time, how
1egal status has 1ittl e to do with whether the 1abor 1aws are
observed, and how accumulating fixed capital equipment is viewed as a
healthy sign of a firm even though some of it may lie idle. Finally,
ADEMI's role is discussed in light of these issues.
A. APPRENTICESHIPS
1. Becoming self-employed
How the people surveyed for this study came to be owners of their
firms varies somewhat. A few were production workers in large firms or
in small formal sector businesses. After acquiring a few skills and
some savings, they decided they were ready to establish their own
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businesses. A baker said he had always intended to be his own boss but
in order to "prepare for it" he had had to work for ten years in a
bakery. "I was prepared to set my business up when I had accumulated
enough money to buy my first sacks of flour and my first bowls," he
said.
In fact, the majority interviewed described the "preparation" in
terms of accumulating enough capital to strike out on their own. When
asked whether their previous employment had given them necessary
skills to run the firm, the answers differed among occupations. For
example, shoe manufacturers who had worked in this field for an
average of fifteen years and whose previous employment was with large
factories, said they learned about different machines, types of
leather, quality of supplies, styles of shoes, etc., but that much of
this knowledge could not be used because their own firms were at a
much lower scale and level of development than that of the large
companies they used to work for. For this reason, they said, they
considered the ability to save some money to buy the initial supplies
was the main advantage to working for someone else. It was considered
a necessary step toward self-employment.
The above tends to substantiate Peattie's "guess" and "common
sense" that those workers leaving large factories to set up their own
shops did not necessarily do so "because they have acquired the
appropriate skills in the large plants" but "that the phenomenon is
accounted for by the higher wages and severance pay which make the
capitalization of a rudimentary workshop more accessible."1
Some of those who had worked for smal 1 microenterprises before
had saved enough money to begin a shoe repair business and had been
able to take some of their former empl oyer's customers away. One man
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commented, "This made my boss very mad but he understood that my wife
had just had a baby and that I wanted a better future for my family."
Among clothing manufacturers interviewed, the average number of
years in the trade was twenty-two. Unlike most shoe manufacturers,
most of these people received their training working for
microenterprises, or had begun sewing at a very young age (young girls
sew for the family) and then struck out on their own. A few had
previous jobs in other lines of business and managed to save a little
to set their shops up. Several inherited the business from their
mothers who could no longer manage the heavy workload. One woman went
to "sewing school" and worked for the owner of the school until she
had "made" enough customers to be on her own. This woman today has her
own sewing school from which many young girls graduate into self-
employment. "Many young girls work as maids for slave wages. I worked
hard not to have to do it and now, because I can, I want to help
others to 1ive in a free way, not as maids."
Invariably, at one time or another, these microentrepreneurs had
started out as apprentices in their previous places of work. For
example, most of the artisans, tailors, and technicians came from
apprenticeships in microenterprises. Artisans had been in the trade
for an average of seven years and had been operating their businesses
for an average of six years at the time of the study. Many said they
had not stayed long at their previous place of employment ( 2 to 3
years) because they had wanted to move out on their own as soon as
they could. "As an apprentice I earned very little because I was paid
for each ceramic piece I made and I made very few of them. I was
learning," one man explained to me. The owner of a clothing
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manufacturing firm told me that even once she had acquired the basic
skills, being an apprentice meant that when an order came in, she was
the last one to be given work. "Some days I came to work and had
nothing to do all day because the owner had not received any customers
or any orders for clothing." She could not Iive under such
uncertainty, she said. 2
2. Training ground for the young
That these microentrepreneurs acquired their most useful skills
through on-the-job training in microenterprises adds to the already
substantial evidence concerning the hypothesis that the informal
sector provides a training ground for those with little or no
education. Only two out of the twenty-four interviewed attended some
kind of training college. The remainder, the majority of whom had not
completed secondary school, learned their present trade as
apprentices.
My own finding is supported by other studies. For example, a
study of the informal sector in Freetown, Sierra Leone concluded that
the "dominant trend seems to be for secondary school dropouts to
undergo a period of apprenticeship for whatever type of activity they
entered." 3 Another study of Kumasi, Ghana revealed that 86.6% of the
workforce (excluding the proprietors) were apprentices. 4 In Lagos,
Nigeria there exists a high turnover rate for labor among informal
sector firms. "Fifty-six percent of the apprentices 1eft the
enterprise that taught the skills, on completion of training." Others
leave to start their own business in three or four years after the
training period. The study concludes that "the informal sector in
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Lagos thus serves as a training ground for many ill-educated young
workers who wish to become self-employed." 5
Apprentices comprised at least 50% of the workforces of the firms
in this study at one time or another. A majority of the apprentices
are not beyond their teens and attend school half the day and work the
other half of the day. While a few receive no remuneration, most get
paid by how much they produce. Those who have dropped out of school
receive slightly higher pay but nowhere near as much as do salaried,
skilled workers.
These young people find out about the jobs primarily by word-of-
mouth. Friends and relatives either work or shop at these firms and
they are constantly inquiring about employment opportunities. Some
find out that the owner is about to get a loan approved so they send
their kid down to apply. Shoe manufacturers said they never had any
trouble finding apprentices. "They are like flies," said one man,
referring to apprentices. A clothing manufacturer said she did not
like turning "so many" young girls away.
Microentrepreneurs were asked how they selected apprentices given
that work experience or skill was not a valid criterion in this case.
Many said they found it difficult to determine an apprentice's
potential for high productivity in terms of his or her intelligence
and talent until they had already been hired. Instead, the owners
considered the reputation of the parents and their friends as an
indicator of the kid's integrity, which seemed to be quite important
to the owner. In most cases, if the apprentice received a good oral
recommendation from someone already working there, he was almost
guaranteed the job. Owners admitted they really had no time to sit
down and evaluate each unskilled worker who came in. A shoe
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manufacturer offered the most succinct description, "I bel ieve that
anyone can learn how to put a heel on but I do not think just anyone
can cut the upper part of the shoe and make it look nice. So when I
need a man to do that job, I have to consider everyone's opinion of
him, not just the opinion of one of my workers who is his friend."
Informal sector firms were seen by these young adults (and
sometimes not so young adults) as the only alternative to acquiring
training to get a well-paying job or set their own business up in the
future.6 In addition to being beyond the financial means of the
majority of the population, universities are perceived to be out of
touch with the skills required to either manage a business or produce
a product. One of the artisan entrepreneurs interviewed was attending
night school to study marketing. He said he had so far learned all he
knows from working for other people and for himself and that the
diploma would "just" give him the recognition he needed to eventually
begin exporting his product.
Technical schools seem to offer better prospects in terms of
acquiring basic skills for running a business than do universities but
these too are beyond what most can afford to pay. Hence, many opt for
training in firms. This does not imply, however, that training in a
firm is second-best or a disadvantage. In industrial countries, for
example, some firms prefer to train their workers on the job because
the kind of work makes it desirable. 7
An advantage cited repeatedly by people was the "contacts" an
employee made while working at a firm. "My friendship with the owner
of this enterprise has hel ped me find out about what I can do and
where I can work. She has many friends whom I know now so I can go ask
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them for a job if I need to some day," a candy factory employee told
me.
3. Growth for the firm
Owners cited the numerous advantages to hiring young apprentices
"with no family responsibilities" and who are the responsibility of
others, i.e., their parents. Apprentices are more likely to accept
piece-work, do not require benefits such as help with medical bills,
they are not entitled to severance pay, two-weeks notice, or minimum
wage because they are under-age, they are less likely to band together
and impose demands, they can be replaced easily because there is an
"infinite" supply of them, and "they always have their parents to go
to anyway."
Apprentices are seen to contribute most to the volume of
production. As the firm grows these workers are placed in an assembly-
line and their tasks become very specialized. A shoe manufacturer
would have six to eight young boys lined up putting heels on the shoes
which would be passed down from three or four men who had done the
sewing of the leather parts of the shoes. Among the older clothing
manufacturing enterprises, it was common to see a person sewing the
main body of a dress, then passing it down to a person who only made
buttonholes who passed it on to the "button sewer" who passed it on to
the "hem person" who, once finished, passed it on to the "iron lady."
The easier tasks were done by young girls while the cutting of the
material and any accoutrements (laceetc.) went to the more
experienced people.
In each case, it seemed as if the apprentices were the ones
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keeping the pace up. Many owners confirmed this impression and said it
was because they had more incentive to work fast since they got paid
at piece-rate. The salaried workers, because they usually happened to
be the most experienced or skilled or who held positions of seniority,
often held things up for the rest of the workers. Part of the
reluctance on the part of owners to let responsibility go to people
outside the family was due to these people's alleged tendency to "not
care" whether production was slow or not. 8
B. DEGREES OF LEGALITY AND OBSERVING THE LABOR LAWS
1. Two separate issues
A firm's legal status is considered a separate issue from the
decision to "legalize" an employee, i.e., to observe the labor laws.
Of those interviewed, 62.5% were entirely illegal which meant they did
not pay taxes, pay attention to health regulations, pay any fees for
licenses, or register as businesses with the government. The remaining
36% enjoyed varying degrees of legal status meaning that some had
bought only one of the "many" licenses required (and some had not
renewed it) or some paid one or two types of taxes (e.g. a 1ocal
business tax).
One owner went through a lengthy explanation of where in the path
toward legalization he was. He bought one license that allowed him to
operate as a commercial establishment for RD$45 (US$13.5) 9 because, he
said, it was good for fifteen years and it was inexpensive enough so
that, in his opinion, the risk of being shut down for not having it
outweighed the cost of buying it. He then bought the right to a
24
"letrero" so no one else could use his firm's name. This cost him
RD$70. (US$21.) However, he still has not bought the main "patente"
(license) which costs RD$75. (US$22.5). Asked why, he said that once
he did, he would have to pay the "impuesto de renta" (rental tax)
which was two percent of his yearly net profit. He said he could not
afford it. He al so said that once he was registered in "their books"
they would "never forget me."
Becoming legal does not necessarily mean the firm begins to
observe the labor laws. Owners of both legal and illegal firms said
they "sometimes did and sometimes did not" observe these laws. One
owner said, "You see, if I were to pay attention to all those
regulations I would not be in existence today. So, I have a license to
operate while I am unable to pay two of my workers the minimum wage."
He has ten employees.
Those employees the owner decided to "legalize" received minimum
wage, were entitled to severance pay, unemployment, and a two-week
notice. Those who were not legal (i.e., not registered as employees of
the firm if the firm was registered or not receiving the legal minimum
even if others were, in an unregistered firm) sometimes received other
benefits such as Christmas bonuses, occasional help to pay a medical
bill ,etc. In general , these benefits largely depended upon the
relationship between the owner and the employee.
2. Employee turnover
A study done of a credit program in Brazil found that illegal
firms preferred a high turnover of their workforces and unskilled
rather than skilled workers. 10 The reasons given for this preference
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were that illegal firms are vulnerable to labor legislation, which
tends to favor the employee when the case is taken to court. The
possibility of having to pay back payroll taxes avoided in the past is
enough for these owners to encourage employees to leave once they have
become eligible for severance pay. 11
The "technique" of firing employees every six months was also
found to be practiced among some of the microentrepreneurs in Santo
Domingo. The use of this "technique" often appeared to coincide with
the level of production and development of the firm. Younger firms
would attempt to avoid minimum wage, benefits, etc., with high labor
turnover. Older firms tried to avoid high turnover because their
production processes tended to require skilled laborers, which they
preferred to retain.
Those owners adopting this method of firing workers every 3 to 6
months began doing so when their firms began to grow. At first, they
said, they could not afford to pay everyone the legal minimum wage and
be left with enough to buy increasing amounts of raw material. The
first two to three years were described as "the most uncertain years"
of their businesses during which in addition to the "day-to-day
struggle," they learned about "all the clever ways employees have" to
get severance pay. 12
Many firms began observing labor laws when, as they explained,
the costs of firing an employee every 3 to 6 months, before he or she
became eligible for the minimum wage and benefits, outweighed the
savings.
The source of these "costs" varied. For some, it was the need for
skil led workers as their firms moved into a different stage of
development. For others, it was the loss of important customers and/or
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output. When some owners decided to diversify or to improve the
qual ity of one of their products, they found it necessary to retain
those employees who were already trained. One owner explained to me,
"When I decided to begin producing children's shoes I was in need of a
man who was experienced. I chose two men who had been working for me
already because I knew them well. I decided that if I made them legal
they would be better workers and they would accept the additional
workl oad." Making an employee "legal" means paying minimum wage and
giving him the right to severance pay. In this case, the cost of
firing the two employees was felt in terms of the difficulty of
finding trained persons to help the firm diversify into a different
line of shoes.
Some of the microentrepreneurs described their "discovery" of the
need for a more skilled, less transient workforce. An artisan
described how he was "so embarrassed" the time he had promised one of
his clients (a shop on the main avenue) a new type of vase which
required special "obra de mano" (handwork) and could not come up with
the product until three or four months later because he had not
foreseen that he was not going to be able to handle it alone. "I had a
very difficult time finding someone who had this skill and I ended up
training one of my own employees how to do it. It took him two months
to learn this difficult task."
A jeweler said he began "legalizing" some of his employees when
he discovered that merchandise was being stolen. "A friend of mine
told me an employee could not be bonded unless I registered him. I
knew this meant legalizing my employees. I ended up legalizing the
whole firm. " The owner of a bakery, who had had particular trouble
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with his employees, said it became extremely important to retain
employees for more than three or six months when he began selling to
1arge bakeries. The latter demanded "pan bueno y sano" (good and
healthy bread) which meant he had to have employees who were trained
and who "cared" for the business as he did. "Those employees who stay
with me for a long time receive better benefits and higher pay than
those who do not. They are also the ones who, when seeing a fly in the
dough, will get it out because they care. This I realized more and
more as time went by." The big bakeries are more demanding in terms of
health standards than individual customers so he pays more attention
now to the quality of the bread than he used to, he explained to me.
Indeed, for all those older firms interviewed, the six-month
firing-hiring cycle or "technique" was abandoned as soon as the lack
of experienced and/or skilled workers was felt. It should be noted
that when the question about turnover rates was first posed, many
people complained that workers left after they were trained. However,
once the conversation concentrated on an earlier episode in the
history of the firm, it was discovered that high turnover rates were
encouraged. This may partially explain the "curious twist on the
literature" observed by Tendler (1983) who points out that the UNO
case in Brazil contrasts with the case of shoe manufacturers in
Colombia (Peattie, n.d.) Firm owners in the UNO study were found to
encourage a high turnover rate of employees whereas those cited in the
Colombian case study complained about employees leaving to set up
their own shops once they had invested time in training them.
C. DEMAND GROWS FOR SKILLED LABOR
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changing fashions in their merchandise became more and more important
to please new customers that had been secured as firms began to grow.
In one case, the need to have different designs required the
firm to employ more skilled tailors than it had when it produced only
one or two lines of clothing. For example, a tailor recently had begun
selling dresses to a store in a middle-to-upper income neighborhood.
He said he was lucky to have two people who were "very" good and had
sewn privately for rich people before because they knew the kinds of
dresses his new client would want in the future. Both these employees
were paid a salary with bonuses depending on how much they produced.
One woman started her business producing only dresses for women.
She later expanded into children's clothing, also female, which
required more refined skills because "children's clothing is higher
priced and people look at it more closely." In her case, however, she
had difficulty finding workers with the desired skills.
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In fact, I found her case to be similar to that of several other
microentrepreneurs who complained about their inability to get or
retain ski] led labor. For some, it may have been a matter of paying
higher wages than what they had been. 13 For others, however, it was a
matter of supply: workers left to set up their own shops more often
than transferring to another firm as skilled workers. Even when it was
very difficult to begin a business, they did anyway, said many
owners. 14
Other studies of the informal sector have also found that these
enterprises seem to face shortages in certain types of labor. In
Lagos, "a third of the enterprises experienced difficulty in
recruiting both skilled and unskilled workers..." 15 In a study of the
informal sector shoe manufacturing industry in Bogota, Colombia, the
author writes: "It was generally agreed by our informants that there
is a shortage of skilled workers..." 16
Setting up one's own shop is perceived as more lucrative than
working for another firm. In addition, opportunities for upward
mobility in terms of responsibility and eventual partnerships within
the firm are very slim for those skilled workers who continue to work
for someone else. To retain trained workers therefore requires
offering higher wages and benefits, thus narrowing the gap between
'legal' and 'illegal' workers. Eventually the firm reaches a stage of
development when it is less costly to 'legalize' its workers than not
to.
D. MOBILITY WITHIN THE FIRM
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Many owners were reluctant to let go of the major
responsibilities in their firms because of their distrust in anyone
else's ability and honesty. Those responsibilities considered major
ones by the owners were handling the daily cash box, hel ping the
larger and most important customers, buying supplies, paying workers,
advertising, opening and closing the workshop, etc. In most cases, the
spouse or a relative would take over in the owner's absence. At the
time of the interviews, more than half said they were seriously
thinking about grooming someone to be manager or "el encargado" (the
one in charge) to leave them (the owners) more time to make new
contacts with buyers and sel lers, to keep the books, to be with the
family, and to take a vacation once in a while.
Those who were not thinking about sharing some responsibility
with their top worker(s) had several different explanations. A few had
already tried and it had not worked, they said, because they spent
more time trying to teach the person how to do it their way than what
it was worth. The rest said they had a brother or sister or spouse who
al ready had the responsibil ity and who took charge when they were
away. It was common among male owners was to have their wives do the
bookkeeping, pay the bills, and sometimes do the selling. Women owners
more frequently had a relative (sister or brother) perform these
duties if they did not do them themselves. Most did not have a spouse
and if they did, he was working full time, looking for work, or did
not consider it his role. By and large, however, the women fel t this
was not a problem because they would always find a relative or a
"conocido" (friend) who would want to help out.
The nature of the firms in which owners were not considering
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sharing responsibil ities was such that they did not require as high
skills as did those whose owners were thinking of grooming a manager.
For example, a candy factory owner said there was no necessity to give
responsibil ity to anyone because the main activity was "chopping
coconuts and sifting sugar." Once an employee learned that, there was
very little need to supervise him or her. A refrigerator repairman, on
the other hand, said that "there is al ways a problem which requires
special attention by someone who is more experienced. When I leave the
shop for something I always need a man who can solve the problem
because I cannot lose any customers."
Those who were concerned about succession outside family circles
and who were thinking about delegating some of the responsibility (the
optimists), complained that their firm had grown to a level where they
could not possibly be the only person able to make a decision. "The
other day I had to be downtown to sign an order with the tienda La
Sirena. That same day I had promised the man who seI is me my clay
that I would be able to receive him. It was out of necessity that I
gave my best worker the authority to purchase the materials from this
supplier," explained an artisan. He said he was glad he did because
now he has more time to spend away from the shop "looking for new
markets." He intends to give him more responsibility (like closing
the shop) after he sees how his employee does for a while. This way he
can go home earlier.
Apparently there is a fine line between seeing the lack of a
manager as a constraint to growth or as a necessity. Those who
complained about "not having the time to do everything" said that if
only they had a person they could rely upon to take over some of their
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duties, they would be able to travel to Puerto Plata, Santiago, and
other cities in the country to sel 1 their merchandise and gain more
customers and thus grow. In this sense, the lack was seen as a
constraint to growth.
On the other hand, when asked why they had not done this yet,
this answer was consistent: it was difficult to find someone who cared
for the firm as much as they did. Several owners said that since they
could not trust anyone to do a good and honest job, it was more
dangerous or risky to let go of the responsibilities. "I still think I
could lose a month's worth of sales if I were to leave decisions to
someone who does not know the enterprise as wel 1 as I do," said the
owner of a mattress repair shop, pondering over the question.
Most mentioned the fact that employees were "not interested" in
staying because they would rather be self-employed. "The best want the
best and that is to work for yoursel f...begin your own
microenterprise," a tailor told me. If a worker has learned and become
experienced in the trade he feel s ready to strike out on his own. In
general, in order to have accumulated enough capital with which to
start the operation, the person will have worked for enough time that
the owner feels he or she has invested substantially in training him
or her. Being self-employed and successful means that your earning
potential is on average 2.8 times higher than the legal minimum
wage. 17
The fact that experienced workers leave to set up their own firms
does not offer a full explanation of why these owners supposedly
cannot find people to take on added responsibilities. In fact, many
owners are reluctant to bring in an outsider to manage the firm
because it signifies less control over the firm. Whereas some
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theorists view family labor as a form of exploitation, this study
indicates that its use is a medium through which to expand and at the
same time retain control of the firm. As mentioned earlier, quite a
few owners had their spouses or close relatives responsible for
bookkeeping, sales, or were available to take over in case the owner
needed to be absent. 18
E. BUYING MACHINES: A SIGN OF GROWTH?
The general perception among these firm owners is that the more
machines their firms have, the healthier they are. Many blamed the
inability to meet production targets on the lack of machines. "If only
I could buy one more sewing machine, my firm could be producing twice
as much," was a remark made by a clothing manufacturer.
Many described buying their first machine as a "gigantic" step
towards growth in which sometimes entire life savings were invested.
Others borrowed from moneylenders or from friends who were in the
business. For some it was a case of inheritance; the parents had the
business before. Some had used an ADEMI loan to buy their first
machine for they had only recently established their businesses when
they joined the program.
Despite this perception, machinery lies idle. It was not unusual
to find one or two machines in a shop not being used. In explaining
why, owners said they had problems with employee absenteeism, they
were unable to repair the machines for various reasons, they lacked
the skilled labor to run the machines, or an entire shift was not
present while I was there. Thus, idle machinery stemmed in many cases
from shortages of skilled labor.
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Power outages also represented a very significant constraint on
the ability to use the machines. Many owners complained that they
never knew when they would be left without electricity and for how
long. Sometimes they were left without electricity for the entire day
so they had to release their workers since they had no work to do.
Those few who were salaried represented a significant drain on the
firm on these occasions yet they were essential to keep because they
were the skilled ones.
Firms have no control over power outages which are becoming
increasingly frequent. The government has had to ration the use of
electricity; each section of the city has its share of blackouts.
Unfortunately, the system is not well organized so that some sectors
get cut off more often than others and there is virtually no warning
or consistency. "If I knew just a few hours in advance that I would be
without light, I could tell my workers not to come," said the owner of
a printing firm. That day he was particularly frustrated because he
had been without electricity for six hours and had a huge order due
the following day. 19
The difficulty in repairing machines is due to two main problems:
the lack of spare parts and the shortage of skil led labor with the
required technical knowhow. Lack of spare parts is a common bottleneck
in developing countries and the ability to get them depends upon their
cost and availability. Even if the part can be afforded, it may not be
available.
For these microfirms, acquiring spare parts is particularly
difficult because the machines they use are usually very old, were
imported decades ago, and the manufacturers have stopped making spare
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parts for them. A common solution is to replace a defective part with
a used part, or less frequently, to build your own part; but for that
you need to know something about the machines. While some of these
owners learned how to repair different machines from their previous
jobs, others had to hire a person or send the machine out to a repair
shop. A few owners said that sometimes it was not worth it to send the
machine for repair because it cost less to buy another used one. 20
Because there are businesses failing constantly and the price of
a new machine is exhorbitant, the used-machine market is a relatively
abundant and thriving one. Growing informal sector manufacturing firms
seem to be in constant search for different machines. As they grow,
they begin to acquire machines that will do specific jobs much faster
than the human hand could. For example, the "average" clothing
manufacturer interviewed had at least four straight-stitch SINGER
machines which are the simplest household sewing machines. As they
grew, they acquired industrial machines in addition to a machine that
does buttonholes, one that does hems and cufts, one that does
embroidery. An industrial machine will produce ninety pairs of pants
in a day compared to thirty to forty produced by a lighter machine.
Having a machine that does buttonholes may mean doubling or tripling
the number of dresses sewn in a day. Having a machine which crochets
lace means many wedding gowns and other similar attire can be made.
The extremely high prices of new machines leave these owners with
1ittle option but to buy used machines. A brand new industrial sewing
machine sells today for RD$3000. (US$900) 21 whereas a second-hand, ten
year old machine can be found for RD$800.(US$240.). The latter
purchase requires substantial time spent, on the part of the owner
looking for the best bargains. As the firm grows, the need to spend
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more time doing this is one factor leading owners to worry about
del egating power to someone el se in the firm. 2 2
Interestingly, idle machinery is not considered a cost to the
firm. My own concern with the issue brought out the problems
described above. Asked if they did not see idle machines as a lost
opportunity to earn more, a few said they had not thought of it, some
said they were keeping unused equipment to sell later in case they
needed cash suddenly, thus making up for this lost opportunity. It is
also possible that these firms use the machines for twice as long as
their "normal" or "expected" life span, so that the marginal cost of
idle machines really is nearly zero. Idle machines may also be kept
for spare parts. A few said they had taken advantage of a bargain
"that does not present itself every day" because "some day" the
machine will be needed and be too expensive to buy. 2 3 In cases where
two shifts would overlap, the owner made sure there would "be enough
machines for everyone to use."
There were other reasons underlying owners' apparent zeal to
accumulate equipment. Several people mentioned how some of the store
owners to whom they sold visited them to compare the number of
machines their firm had to other firms in order to assess their
productive capacity. Customers wanted to make sure jobs could be done
on schedule, and suppliers were more inclined to make contracts with a
firm that could absorb a steady flow of raw materials "because it has
the machines." Skil led people were more apt to stay with the firm if
they could learn how to run different machines. 24
F. ADEMI'S ROLE
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1. Quantity versus quality of employees
Owners were very cautious about describing their changing needs
for labor because they did not want "anyone" to think their firms were
stagnating. Who the "anyone" was determined whether the change in the
number of employees was viewed as a positive one or not. For example,
owners perceived that if they reduced the number of employees, they
would get pressure from ADEMI to get the number of employees back up
to original levels. "When I have had to let some employees go I have
almost immediately been pressured to hire some more. ADEMI looks at
the number of employees, not at who they are," said a clothing
manufacturer.25
This man described how he had to lay off three apprentices to
hire a "family man" who was skilled because the store he had signed a
contract with was demanding higher quality work. While it was less
costly to have the three youngsters working instead of one grown man
"who has to feed his family and who needs certain benefits," he
decided it would be more profitable in the long run to become this
store's steady supplier. His relationship with the storeowner
improved; the latter considered the decision a sign of "good
management. "26
This was the only owner among those interviewed who had actually
had this experience. It was difficult to determine exactly how much
pressure comes from the ADEMI promoters. Credit programs, such as
ADEMI strongly emphasize the number of employees as an indicator of
the health of these firms and pay less attention to the skill level or
productivity of the labor. When promoters were asked why they did not
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keep track of who was replaced by whom in a firm, the general response
was that it would be too time consuming and that it didn't make a
difference anyway. The important thing was to see that the workforce
was growing.
The risk in overemphasizing the quantity of employed is in
overlooking the quality or productivity of those employed. It may
lead to erroneous assessments of the viability of the firm and thus to
incorrect judgements as to who deserves a loan. If growing means that
the requirements for skilled labor increase and the firm begins
replacing apprentices with experienced workers, then a decrease in the
number of employees might indicate an indicate in productivity.
Likewise, a swol len workforce may be hiding a low level of
productivity making the firm weaker than most. In the first case, an
opportunity would be lost whereas in the second case, a bad loan would
be made.
While many studies focus on the informal sector as a major source
of employment, very little is known about the conditions under which
this labor is absorbed or how productive it really is. Keeping a
record of the skills levels of labor replacements would facilitate
research on this subject. Secondly, we expect the average real wage
and output per employee both to rise as the workforce becomes more
skilled. These may be better measures of the success of the firm than
simply the size of the workforce.
Finally, this analysis tends to indicate that assessing the
success of firms on the basis of the capital-labor ratio of each may
be particularly misleading, for two reasons. First, the measure of
capital is not depreciated to show the true value of the machines.
Second, the labor measure itself is not divided to reflect the lack of
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homogeneity between skilled and unskilled laborers.
2. Legal i zation
The fact that ADEMI issues loans to firms which are illegal does
not make the program unique. The UNO program in Brazil even seems to
discourage those who want to become legal if it feels they are not
financially ready to assume the numerous costs involved in
legalization. 27
Tendler points out that, while it may be realistic to resign
oneself to this fact, it is somewhat disturbing to think that if these
firms were not "protected" from the law, they would not survive. The
results presented above tend to indicate, however, that as firms
proceed to a stage of development requiring more skilled labor, the
incentives to remain illegal are diminished. In this very real sense,
ADEMI loans may ultimately encourage legalization of firms by their
owners.
Lack of legal standing also explains part of the problem these
firms have in getting loans from formal sector banks. A couple of the
firms interviewed already qualified for the smaller loans from the
Banco del Comercio; the value of their capital assets covered the
guarantee required, they had a good credit history with ADEMI, their
products were selling well, and some already had links through savings
and/or checking accounts with this bank. However, they told me they
could not fill out the section of the application which asked for
their "patente" number because they were not completely legalized yet.
This is one step toward "graduation" ADEMI must deal with sooner or
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later. 28
3. Lending
ADEMI began lending for working capital only, a characteristic
which distinguished it from other credit programs which lend for both
fixed and working capital. The idea was that small loans with short
payback periods and no prior client training requirement would both
streamline the process and not overburden the recipient with financial
debt. The experience of credit programs such as the Dominican
Development Foundation which lend larger amounts, for longer periods,
and require training prior to receiving the loan, was that many
beneficiaries were unable (and sometimes unwilling) to pay back the
loan after they had invested in machinery or other fixed capital
assets. The result was a decapitalization of the fund and an
inappropriate "learning process" for the beneficiaries.
When a client first joins ADEMI he or she is eligible for a
RD$100 to RD$300 loan which must be paid back in 3 weeks to a month.
Monthly charges are between 2% and 3% which include closing costs and
administrative costs. 29 Each successive loan is larger and will only
be issued once the previous one has been paid back. Firms which show
signs of growth and which have good repayment records are eligible for
the maximum amount. Those microentrepreneurs interviewed all reached
the maximum available of RD$5000 to be paid out in installments over 5
months. The theory behind lending larger amounts over several loans
instead of in one lump sum is that the client "acquires and develops
in a methodical form his/her potential for growth and repayment
habits." 30
Concurrent with lending in small amounts was the rule that these
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loans were to be for working capital only. For those firms borrowing
at the lower end of the scale, this made sense but for firms who were
growing and buying machinery, the larger loans were beginning to be
used for fixed capital. In its executive summary, ADEMI stipulates
that financing for fixed capital will require a different policy in
terms of repayment periods, interest rates, etc., but does not go into
detail.
While there may not yet exist a detailed written policy on
lending for fixed capital, currently there are several
microentreprises which have borrowed for that purpose only. These are
the firms which have made the list for "graduates" to formal sector
credit. ADEMI feels that these firms have grown to a level where they
can easily absorb larger loans for expanding their productive capacity
and that they are, in general , beyond the "immediate needs" stage
associated with the need for working capital.
Buying machines is perceived as a sign that the firm is growing
and is healthy. According to those interviewed, customers who own
retail stores will visit their firms to compare the number of machines
they have to the number in other firms in order to assess their
productive capacity. Several owners had begun investing their latest
loans in machinery, they said, because they wanted to take advantage
before prices went up "too much." This behavior, of course, is not
surprising in an economy with recent annual inflation rates of above
30%. According to informed sources at a major industrial country
embassy, the inflation rate was above 3% a month for the latter half
of 1984 and beginning of 1985, which means that the real interest rate
on ADEMI loans may be negative, thereby subsidizing the cost of
41
capital to these firms.
Finally, for those who had to buy machines much before ADEMI
appeared on the scene, the credit represented a release from paying
high interest rates charged by people selling the goods. Under those
conditions, buying machines was a "very slow process which cost a lot
more than if you bought it with cash and at once," explained a tailor.
Lending for fixed capital acquisition to firms with little
experience with expansion may imply additional responsibility to see
that the loan is used efficiently.3 1  Raising the interest rate to
real positive levels would take care of the problem much more easily
and at a lower cost than having ADEMI supervise these firms. ADEMI,
however, is bound by law to a maximum rate it can charge clients,
which limits its ability to control what is presently, under negative
rates, perfectly rational economic behavior among firms, i.e., to buy
equipment and leave it idle.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Data from a Yale study show this is the case for the majority
of shoemakers setting up their firms (Peattien.d.,p.222)
2. Ekpenyoung (1985:27) finds in Nigeria that some workers see sel f-
employment as a chance to be independent and "of earning 'big
man' status through material wealth."
3. Sethuraman (1981:55)
4. Ibid:92
5. Ibid:73
6. The information gathered in this study is not sufficient to
determine whether these apprenticeships assure well-paying future
jobs or not.
7. I am grateful to Judith Tendler for pointing this out to me.
8. Upward mobility within the firm is an issue discussed in another
section.
9. All U.S. dollar figures are based on the March 1985 exchange rate
of U.S.$1.00=RD$3.00 (approximate)
10. Tendler (1983:142)
11. The author notes that this "does not apply to legal firms, which
have no fear of the fired employee because the severance payment
is taken care of by the state, and the conditions under which an
employee can be fired are not stringent." (Tendler:142)
12. Severance pay means double salary over a two-week period which
can be quite taxing to the firm.
13. There were three people who said they had placed at least one
worker on a sal ary because he had become too good and made "a
lot" of money working at piece-rate. They said that even though
this had increased their production, they had had substantial
increases in the costs of their raw material s lately and could
not afford to spend more money on wages.
14. I heard of one case where an employee found a job with a formal
sector firm but I was told that it was rare because there "was
more opportunity in having a business and being your own boss."
15. Sethuraman (1981:73)
16. Peattie (n.d.:221)
17. Average monthly wage earned by a firm owner was RD$500.(US$150).
The legal monthly minimum wage is RD$175.(US$52.5), close to what
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many public sector employees make today in the Dominican
Republic.
18. Ekpenyoung (1985:24) also found that entrepreneurs preferred to
retain sole control over decisions and income.
19. Few of these microentrepreneurs pay for electricity to begin with
because they tap into lines without the knowledge of the local
el ectric company.
20. It was usual 1 y when the part cost a lot that buying another
machine was cheaper. This was a rare happening. Some also said
using an ADEMI loan made this option more attractive.
21. Exchange rate use is US$1.00= RD$3.00.
22. Usually it is the spouse who takes up the responsibility.
23. Some people were a little confused about the concept. For
example, in one case, we talked about it for a long time, and at
the end, the onwer said that in any case, he believed it was not
lost because he saved money by not hiring a worker to use the
machine.
24. Ekpenyoung (1985) finds in his study on the craft sector in two
Nigerian towns that "adequate equipment is needed to get
contracts from large firms or government departments, with their
quality requirements and time limit. Furthermore, the best
equipped firms attract high status customers and numerous
apprentices and journeymen." (1985:24)
25. One of the additional advantages to having apprentices was that
one could increase the "number of employed" rapidly and thus
improve the chances of being accepted by a credit program.
26. This same man said that suppliers and customers (business
contacts in general) sometimes advised him to buy a machine that
would do the job of several workers so he would be "more
efficient."
27. Tendler (1983:137)
28. ADEMI has recently begun requiring that firms requesting loans
over a certain amount pay to receive technical assistance. A
similar scheme could be developed to legalize those firms who
receive the larger loans.
29. This rate cannot be compared to a commercial bank's rate because
the latter will not lend such small amounts for such short time
periods.
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30. ADEMI Document, Annex V:3
31. A study done on women's participation in A
borrow as much as they will loan" attitude,
among owners "that their businesses were
infinite expansion..." (Reichmann, 1984, p.
DEMI found an "I'll
reflecting a belief
capable of almost
28)
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CHAPTER TWO: LINKS WITH SUPPLIERS
Lack of access to raw materials is frequently cited as a major
constraint to the development of small scale enterprises in the
informal sector. Studies show that difficulties arise from these
microentrepreneurs' bargaining position vis-a-vis larger firms in the
formal sector, their lack of working capital, government legislation
which discriminates against them, etc.1
Most studies show that informal sector microenterprises rely on
small retailers in the informal sector for their inputs. In Lagos,
Nigeria, 80% of sampled firms bought their raw materials from other
small enterprises. 2 In another city in Nigeria, while most inputs
originated in the formal sector, there was no direct link with the
sector because retail traders carried out an intermediary role. In
Ghana, the direct link with the formal sector is said to be negligible
al so because of the presence of middlemen. Hal f of the enterprises
sampled in Jakarta purchased their inputs from small enterprises. In
Manila, a majority depended on small firms for their supplies. 3
Unfortunately, it is rare that these kinds of studies go into
depth about the nature of these links, be they with small or large,
informal or formal sector firms. There also is little insight as to
how the microentrepreneurs see these relationships. For example,
Schmitz criticizes Gerry (1974) for talking about how many producers
rely on recycled materials without explaining the significance of
this. "Does it mean that the supply is unreliable, that the small
producers are at the mercy of those who discard materials, or what?" 4
The present study shows how some microentrepreneurs who have
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changed suppliers view their different relationships. For example, as
their firms have grown, the ability to choose whom to buy from has
improved. For some, this has been a change from many suppliers to one
or two. The literature generally portrays this reliance on one or two
suppliers as a relationship of dependency, whereas these firmowners
felt they had gained more control over their suppliers.
A. Changing Relationships as Firm Grows
Firm owners who had been in operation for at least five years
talked about their experiences of buying from small retail firms in
the informal sector and then gradually changing to larger retail and
wholesale suppliers in both the informal and formal sectors. The
experiences seemed quite similar across industries. Several case
studies, in fact, have already shown a tendency for the larger and
older manufacturing firms to rely on formal sector suppliers. 5
Why do they switch? Owners described the time when they first
established the firm as one during which their main goal was to
increase their income enough to be able to buy their raw materials
from enterprises which could sell at lower prices. Several were
"lucky" because they got money from a relative or were able to borrow
from a friend or a moneylender. One man said he had made a deal with
his "best" and newly acquired customer to buy three dozen pairs of
shoes from him, "the first time anyone had bought so many from me at
one time!" With that money he bought his next supplies from someone
who sold materials more cheaply than his regular man but who sold in
larger minimum quantities. In those days (ten years ago) it was
easier to get supplies on credit, he said, so he was able to continue
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buying from this new supplier for a while until he began bringing in
enough income to buy with cash.
One of the main advantages cited by owners of buying from smal 1
firms in the informal sector was that they sold raw materials in small
quantities. When these microfirms were young, they could only absorb
small quantities of inputs given their productive capacity, and could
not use, in addition to not being able to afford, large quantities at
one time. These small suppliers also extended credit which enabled
some firm owners to produce "when times were bad."
In recalling those "days of struggle" the general feeling was one
of relief that they were over. Owners said that the main drawback to
having to buy from the small firms was that it was very difficult to
count on a steady flow of supplies. One man described how he was
always hesitant to commit himself to a customer because he could never
be sure about getting the necessary materials. "The problem for me
was never demand, always supply," he said.
Other disadvantages to relying upon the smaller firms in the
informal sector for inputs were that their prices were higher than
those of larger firms, the qual ity of the merchandise was not good,
there was less of a variety to choose from, and it was time consuming
to shop around "looking for everything."
That the prices offered by smaller retail firms in the informal
sector are higher than those offered by larger firms is not surprising
since as intermediaries they buy from the latter and sell at a mark-up
price to make some profit. As discussed earlier, there is substantial
evidence concerning the role of many very small scale enterprises and
hawkers who, as "middlemen," make a living by gathering materials and
selling them to firms which need them for manufacturing.
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Less variety or fewer brands offered by small firms meant less
control over qual ity and price for smal 1 manufacturing enterprises.
The concern over quality of input was particularly strong among shoe,
ceramic, and clothing manufacturers apparently because the quality of
their inputs tended to vary more widely.
The time spent in shopping around for various materials could
have been more of a disadvantage for older firms than for younger
firms because the older firms described having today (now that their
firms were big), many more problems related to time management than
they had had when they were first starting. For both kinds of firms,
reliance upon small suppliers was perceived as a disadvantage since
small suppliers could not provide enough variety in materials needed
for production.
Despite these drawbacks, owners said that two advantages to these
smal ler suppliers were that they offered. closer personal
relationships, which made terms more flexible when the firm was having
trouble paying, and that they were located close by, thus minimizing
transportation costs. For these two reasons, owners had not severed
their ties completely with these firms. In fact, a few
microentrepreneurs said they were buying from these firms again
because the larger suppliers were "hoarding" materials to "wait until
the prices go up again." Some owners also said they sometimes needed
the flexibility to send a "boy down to buy a box of nails if we run
out." Such action was made possible because of close proximity and
the ability or willingness of these suppliers to sell in small
quantities.
The disadvantages to buying from the larger suppliers provide an
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answer to why these owners do not initially buy from the large firms:
1) the firm is required to buy large quantities (to take advantage of
the wholesale price) which it cannot when it is small; 2) firms used
to be able to buy on credit but today suppliers want cash; 3)
transportation costs are higher because large firms are located on the
outskirts of the city. For some, the transportation required poses a
significant problem, especially if they do not have private means of
transportation and there is no public transportation in place.
Owners said that on the off-chance that a formal sector firm
"might" ask them to fill out a sales receipt with their firm's name on
it, having the firm as a supplier was a disadvantage. Some described
how they got around the sales receipt requirement, if it existed, by
buying the supplies at a little higher price (but still lower than
what was offered by the small suppliers) in order to obtain a receipt
without their name or their firm's name on it. 6 In general , however,
illegality did not seem to stand in the firm's way to obtaining raw
materials. Owners said that suppliers needed a market in which to
sel 1 their goods and more often than not disregarded "detail s" of
receipts and would not insist upon them.
The advantages to buying from larger suppliers seem to outweigh
the disadvantages. Their prices are considered "more affordable"
because materials are purchased in bulk. Larger suppliers have a wider
variety of brands from which to choose which, owners pointed out,
became important when they began concentrating on the qual ity of their
products. The same was said of being able to get better quality
materials from these firms. "Knowing where they get it [leather] from
is important," said a shoe manufacturer.
Several people said that in addition to saving them time by not
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doing the shopping around themselves, larger suppliers can be used as
contacts for prospective buyers. They described having made some of
their better contracts through the firms who sold them the raw
materials because the larger buyers of shoes, for example, also sold
raw materials which they bought from the same supplier.
The advantage most frequently cited to buying raw materials from
larger and wholesale suppliers was that they were more reliable
sources because since they were bigger, they carried more clout than
the small suppliers which meant they had fewer problems in getting the
materials. "When most 'small' enterprises are unable to get the
'good' 1eather, I am abl e to," explained a shoe manufacturer who had
grown to having more than 20 employees. In times of scarcity he has
an advantage over smaller firms.
B. 'Dependency' From the Firm's Point of View
Literature which discusses informal-formal sector relationships
frequently depicts informal sector firms as being dependent upon
formal sector supply sources. From the perspective of firms which
have grown, however, buying from these sources was seen as reducing
their dependency upon the small retail firms in the informal sector.
Many described being "at the mercy" of the smal 1 firms who were
unrel iable, relatively expensive, and generally "disconnected" with
the circles where the "good" customers were.
As discussed earlier, owners' goals were to be able to earn
enough and save enough to begin buying at wholesale prices from the
larger firms. The advantages of the latter outweighed the advantages
of buying from retail firms. One woman used to have an arrangement in
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which her customers supplied the cloth and deducted its cost from the
price of the finished product. She had no choice but to accept the
price they quoted. This was an obvious case of 'dependency'.
Nevertheless, several owners considered her to be "priveleged" and
wished they had had such an arrangement when they were first starting.
The woman said that at the time, she also considered hersel f
"better off" than others because she was getting her suppl ies more
cheaply and she had a steady suppl ier as wel1 as a customer. "My
enterprise was first starting and I was looking for customers." She
said that later on, however, she real ized that there was "a lot of
demand out there" so from that perspective, the relationship was not
the most advantageous because "I wanted to sell my clothes at the
prices everyone else was selling and I could not." Nevertheless, the
relationship has improved over the years. 7
A major reason why these owners of the older successful firms
considered switching to fewer but larger suppliers as becoming more
independent was that as they grew to where they had a "good"
clientele, i.e., stores which request a steady flow of merchandise,
the need for new reliable suppliers with sufficient stocks became very
important. A reliable supplier was considered especially advantageous
in times of scarcity, because it meant being able to produce something
others could not for lack of raw material s.
C. The Role of Imports in the Changing Relationship
Several of the older firms used imported raw materials. There
were a couple of firms in the shoe manufacturing industry which had
been able to replace some of the domestic leather they bought with
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imported leather. Local leather is of poor quality so in order to
improve the quality of their products these firm owners explained how
they had looked for suppliers that imported.
One artisan who did ceramics had a similar story about searching
for better quality clay. Imported clay is easier to work with and
less costly because it doesn't crack as often as the local clay does.
In this case, mixtures of both were used.
In most cases, using imported inputs (in contrast to using
domestic inputs), meant that the suppliers required proof of sales.
Indeed, some of those firms who were using the "better leather" and
the "good cloth" were legal. There were a few firms, however, which
were not legal but somehow managed to obtain imported materials
anyway. They explained that some microenterprises in the area would
occasionally have these materials in stock. 8  The suppl iers were
unreliable in terms of delivery, however, which increased the risk of
losing a "good" customer.
An additional drawback to relying on small firms for imports was
that "one never knows where the supplies come from." A couple of
owners were sure that, once or twice, they had bought leather that had
been smuggled in because there would have been "no other way" in which
this microfirm owner could have obtained what he did. Owners seemed
particularly concerned about inadvertantly getting materials which had
been obtained in an illegal way. There were cases described to me by
different people about microentrepreneurs being arrested, unaware that
they had bought stolen materials. 9 Most of the time these goods were
overpriced and of mediocre quality as well. The risk of tangling with
the law for those using imported inputs, therefore, is a strong
incentive to get registered.
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Despite the desire of a few of these firms to use imported inputs
to improve the quality of their products and break into the
"exclusive" markets of the higher class in Santo Domingo, there are
definite drawbacks to relying upon imports regardless of whether they
are bought from small or large firms. First, some owners said their
suppliers had problems with delays in customs and sometimes it would
take two weeks to get the goods out. 10 Second, laws change all the
time, making prices and/or availability unpredictable. Tariffs on
imported intermediate goods and raw materials are relatively lower
than tariffs on imported final consumption goods because the former
are subject to substantial tariff exemptions. Large domestic
producers of raw materials, however, sometimes persuade the Ministry
of Commerce to disallow the regular tariff exemptions on raw materials
that would otherwise lower import tariffs from 70 to 15 percent. 1 1
This creates uncertainty among the users of imported inputs. Third, a
microfirm has difficulty competing with larger domestic manufacturers
which also use imported inputs because the tariff exemptions are
granted to the large firms and not to the mircrofirms. Improving the
qual ity of a good by using imported inputs, therefore, is much more
difficul t for a small manufacturer than it is for a larger
manufacturer. This may be why only a few in this study rely on
imported inputs.
Given their present situation, as described above, microfirm
owners said that they would benefit in the short-run if the government
remained in what they called, the "IMF austerity mood." Under
austerity, tariff exemptions on raw materials would be removed. Large
producers being protected by these hidden "subsidies," would have to
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raise prices upon their removal. Those microenterprises which rely
mostly upon domestically produced inputs would find that their costs
were not rising as quickly due to the removal of such subsidies,
however. The relative disadvantage of being an illegal firm, in terms
of access to imported inputs, also would diminish.
D. ADEMI's Role
1. Direct effects of credit
One of the main rationales for giving loans to microenterprises
in the informal sector is to lower the costs of their raw materials to
enable them to accumulate surpluses to reinvest in the firm. Without
access to formal sector credit, these firms borrow from moneylenders
who charge exhorbitant interest rates and who offer very short terms
on the loans. In Santo Domingo, rates can get as high as 20% a day.
The way a firm survives when its only access to credit is the
moneylender is to purchase small quantities of raw materials, usually
on a daily basis. Small firms are willing to supply small amounts but
often at relatively higher costs. For example, the price per unit for
wooden heels is RD$6.00 whereas when bought from larger suppliers by
the dozen, they cost RD$4.00 each. 12
Al 1 firm owners said they were grateful to ADEMI because the
credit had allowed them to buy raw materials in bulk at wholesale
prices. Owners said that the ability to get the materials many times
depended upon whether they could buy a large quantity or not. Often
times the smaller firms or hawkers did not have the goods. People
described times when they had to turn "small" purchase orders down
because they had not been abl e to purchase enough raw material s to
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produce enough. "If only I had those extra five hundred pesos five
years ago, I could have met that man's request. I lost a very good,
potential customer that way. He was testing me and I failed," said a
clothing manufacturer. Another person said, "There were many
opportunities missed where I could have bought a shipment of cloth
from someone if only I had had the extra money."
The ability to get raw materials at the lowest possible cost was
crucial to their firms' survival , owners said. The savings made
through bulk purchasing often made the difference between whether
there would be enough profits to reinvest in the coming month or not.
Unfortunately, it was impossible to get figures on the exact change of
these costs because owners had not kept records.
2. Indirect effects of credit on the relationships with suppliers
There were other reasons why the lack of credit was seen as an
obstacle to growth, reasons which rarely feature in the literature.
Many owners said that receiving credit from an established institution
enhanced the firm's image and played an important role in increasing
the confidence the larger suppliers had in the microfirm's ability to
pay on time and in its regularity of demand. When suppliers needed the
"flexibility" to delay an order because of a temporary shortage, they
could feel confident that their clients would "survive" those times, a
few people explained.
More than half of those interviewed said their experience has
been that, when dealing with customers, suppliers, and fellow
businessmen, it "would be very good" to owe money to an institution.
A shoe manufacturer said: "I quickly figured out that I would be in a
more advantageous position if I could only borrow from a bank because
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then my suppliers would see that if a bank trusted me enough to lend
me its money, then why should not my suppliers trust me to pay them on
time for their materials?" Today, he says, he is trusted by an
institution but, nevertheless, people (including himself) are becoming
more and more reluctant to issue credit because of the inflationary
environment.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Gerry, 1978; Schmitz, 1982
2. Sethuraman (1981: 63,87,98,117,126)
3. Ibid.
4. Schmitz (1982:440)
5. Sethuraman (1981:196)
6. I was unable to verify this practice by talking to suppliers so
this statement is solely based on what the firmowners said.
7. She eventual1y "convinced" the store owners that her clothes
merited higher prices and they agreed so that today they are
considered her "best suppl ier and consumer."
8. Suppliers were not interviewed so it was impossible to determine
the exact status of these firms.
9. This happened to a client of ADEMI's who was put in jail for
buying wood imported from Haiti which is strictly prohibited.
10. One source of delay is that all imports must have the approval of
the Dominican Consul in the country of origin. This means that
when the consul is absent for a few days, the goods are not
transported. (Conversation with Dominican businessman)
11. Sources at a major industrial country embassy in Santo Domingo.
12. A shoe manufacturer, personal communication.
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CHAPTER THREE: UNSATURATED AND UNTAPPED MARKETS
Despite the present economic crisis in the Dominican Republic,
sample entrepreneurs were very optimistic about expanding markets for
their products. My own impressions as an outsider were somewhat
different. A few days before my arrival in the country, President
Blanco had announced price hikes for rice and other staples. Rice,
being very dear to the Dominicans, brought people out into the streets
to riot in protest. Stories abounded about the poor looking for
leftover vegetables in the market place to feed their children with,
the middle class tightening its belt and losing to inflation, and the
rich unable to buy imported wine (the only kind there is) because its
price is rising as import restrictions are enacted to alleviate the
growing balance-of-payments deficit. All-in-all , the situation looked
bleak.
A. Demand is not a Constraint
During the course of the interviews, it became a little clearer
why firmowners, in general, believed demand for their products was not
a constraint on expansion. Owners did say that times were difficult
now but they attributed this mostly to the rising costs of inputs, the
shortage of skilled labor, and the fact that because their firms were
larger now, they were vulnerable to "many more things" than they used
to be when they were smal 1 er. Overall, the general perception of each
microentrepreneur was that there is infinite demand among consumers
within each income class but the difficulty lay in penetrating the
different markets initially. Owners linked their increased
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vulnerability to attempts to differentiate their products and/or
diversify into different products. The challenge was to overcome this
"vulnerability" and once having penetrated the market, there they
would find infinite demand.
A substantial portion of the interviews in which I talked about
market demand was spent discussing people's goals and aspirations.
Therefore, for example, while many expressed the desire to reach the
upper income class markets to capture the profit made by selling their
products at a higher price per unit, only two of those in my sample
had achieved this goal. The advantages and disadvantages of selling
to one type of customer versus another were largely based upon owners'
perceptions of what their colleagues' experiences were rather than
their own experiences.
The fact that there is already empirical evidence citing similar
perceptions about markets among manufacturers in the developing world
lends support to what these owners told me. Peattie says in her study
of shoe manufacturers in Colombia that, "over and over again we heard
manufacturers say that their problem was not the lack of markets, but
in obtaining the capital and raw materials to satisfy the demand
existing out there."' Tendler, writing about manufacturing firms who
were clients of the UNO credit program in Brazil, says:
For these firms, the 'constrained' market was
even less of a concern than it was for the retail
stores; the firms seemed to imagine a limitless
market for their products and services, the only
constrai 5t being their inabil ity to reach that
market...
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B. Selling to the "Tiendas"
"In the first stages of shoe production," Peattie writes, "...the
functions of production and distribution were linked by a single set
of stores; the ordinary firm was a household-size operation with the
shop in front and the workshop behind." 3 This was found to be true
for shoe manufacturers in Santo Domingo and for tailors, artisans, a
sweets factory, and a refrigeration repair shop, in fact, all those
interviewed except for a candlemaker. Owners said that when they were
"small" they found it advantageous to sell to individuals because they
could not produce large quantities then, and they could use cheap
materials (vinyl, polyester, domestic clay) because people in their
neighborhood were poor and were willing to buy their goods. Those who
were located in an area far away from the central commercial district
felt they had no choice but to cater to low income clientele close by.
A common way to reach final buyers is to sell to the "buhoneros"
(street vendors) who crowd the main avenues with their makeshift
kiosks and blankets on the sidewalks in front of the stores. The
"buhoneros" buy small quantities of dresses, shoes, ceramic vases,
etc. from these workshops and make a meager profit by selling their
wares to the crowds.
Owners said that as they were able to secure raw material s at
bulk prices, they began producing one or two styles in larger
quantities. The goal was to wean themselves from the "buhoneros" and
from retailing to low income consumers. The "tiendas" al so sell to
low income people but they buy in large quantities. The disadvantages
to sel 1 ing to the "buhoneros" were that they bought in smal 1
quantities and only "when business was good," leaving the firmowners
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"col gando" (hanging) in bad times.
At this stage, owners began sell ing to the "tiendas" (large
retail stores) along the main commercial strip in Santo Domingo. The
advantages of selling to these new customers are that they sell the
low-quality merchandise to "larger" populations of low income
households; they represent a steadier demand than the "buhonero" or
individual client; and the owner knows at least 15 days in advance
that a certain amount of merchandise will be sold because the stores
fill out "pedidos" (orders) periodically so he or she knows how much
to produce.
Owners said that the "type of product" consumed by the lower
income classes is such that in order to do well at selling it, it has
to be produced in large quantities. For example, making dozens of
pairs of plastic shoes in which maybe you vary the colors a little is
"safer" than making dozens of leather shoes because "you know there
are many more poor peopl e than rich peopl e." Owners seemed to feel
that as long as they could only produce shoes of lower quality, they
were better off sel 1 ing to the "tiendas." One man said, "If I had a
store in the rich neighborhood, nobody would buy my shoes. If I were
rich, I wouldn't buy them either."
There are disadvantages, however, associated with sel l ing to the
"tiendas." First, firms must transport their products to these stores,
which represents an additional cost to the firm. Second, since these
stores buy at wholesale prices, the firm does not get the profit it
would if it sold at the retail price as they do to "buhoneros." Some
clothing manufacturers said that these stores sell their dresses for
three times as much as what they buy them for. Third, several owners
said they felt they had less power over the "tiendas" because the
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competition among their suppliers was keener than the competition they
faced from microenterprises such as their own. "The competition used
to come mainly from all the other clothing manufacturers like myself,
who are small and cannot produce that much. Now, I must compete with
some of the 1 arger domestic producers because they al so sel 1 to the
'tiendas'," said one producer of jeans.
The owners of the younger firms interviewed said they still sell
to individuals because some of the "tiendas" do not pay on time, their
checks bounce, and "the larger microfirms already sell to them
anyway." Peattie was told the same story by a workshop owner and she
writes about the problems of selling to "tiendas":
A larger producer with whom we discussed this
issue said that this was a problem faced
particularly by the smaller producers, who tended,
in turn, to sell to small and undercapitalized
distributors.4
One woman who had found individual customers more profitable
(although "maybe not the most reliable"), said, "It is better for me
to spend extra time on one item when I can get three times as much for
it than I could selling at wholesale prices by the dozen."
In addition to the disadvantages, described by owners, of sel 1 ing
to "tiendas", changing to the new seller-buyer relationship was an
ordeal. The initial contact required an extra effort to market samples
of the product. Several clothing manufacturers said that convincing
the store that the firm was reliable was the hardest part. Two people
claimed that "tienda" owners had tried to intimidate them by saying
they could buy merchandise from an importer at a comparable price and,
at the same time, be sure about the quality and date of delivery. In
their cases, they said they had to supply these stores for a couple of
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months before these were willing to sign a three-month contract.
Despite the sometimes undesirable relationship with the
"tiendas," owners said they were better off than before because once
the contact was made, the relationship was strong enough to where they
could count on regular purchase orders. Reducing the uncertainty
caused by fluctuations in demand associated with individual consumers
was considered an extremely important advantage over those firms still
retailing. Owners explained that while there exists an "infinite"
demand for the products, it is easier to deal with steady demand than
volatile demand. That the big stores could accommodate changes in
volume better than their own smaller firms was the general perception.
C. Improving Quality to Reach "Boutiques"
The steady flow of requests for production coming to some of the
owners in this study, has enabled them to begin concentrating more on
quality and different styles, in the case of clothing, footwear, and
ceramics manufacturers. These owners expressed strong desires to
compete with formal sector firms which cater to the more affluent
sections of the population, such as "boutiques." The advantage to
this which was mentioned most frequently was that larger profits per
unit of production were made because the merchandise could be sold at
a much higher price than that sold to the "tiendas."
One woman decided to increase the variety of styles but continued
making women's and girls' clothing. Once she had begun supplying two
of the larger "tiendas" in the city, she thought it necessary to
"distinguish" herself in the field. She now makes dresses for gala
affairs, first communion, 15th birthdays (an important celebration in
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the Dominican Republic), in addition to the aprons, summer shifts,
skirts and blouses she has made all along. She said that once she
could count on a monthly purchasing order, she felt it safe to
experiment with new styles.
A shoe manufacturer began diversifying into leather shoes of
different styles after he had been supplying several distributors
along the main avenue. He said it has been a dream of his to test out
his own ideas. A self-taught artisan said she was taking classes to
learn how to make porcelain vases which she planned to sell to some of
the boutiques which are located in the luxury hotels. She said she
already had interested clients. "I showed them what I could do and
they liked it."
There were only a few cases in which microenterprises had begun
selling higher quality goods. The majority in the sample had not
tried to yet, even though it was their goal. They said that they were
adjusting to the current climate and that they would have to "wait"
for a while until "things got better."
Several said that their opportunities to reach the more affluent
markets would improve as long as the government had to improve its
balance-of-payments deficit. The recent measures taken to reduce
imports of final consumption goods through devaluations of the peso
were interpreted as a good sign for them because it meant that retail
stores, which sell imports and therefore are the ones which cater to
the rich, would be substituting these with domestic goods. The larger
domestic producers of these goods would not present "too much"
competition in the short run, to the extent that they rely more
heavily on imported raw materials than most of these microfirms do.
To the extent that their inputs will be subject to higher tariffs
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because of fewer exemptions, as discussed in Chapter Two, larger
producers' costs of production will go up forcing them to raise
prices. The increase in the share of the formal sector retail firms'
market may be indirect in that the microfirms will become the
suppliers of finished goods to these retailers which would, in turn,
sel 1 to the publ ic. Thus, the austerity measures may improve the
microfirms' position in relation to that of larger formal sector
domestic producers who presently sell their products through the same
retailers.
D. ADEMI's Role
One of the most interesting effects of the ADEMI program, and one
over which owners seemed to get very excited, was the nonfinancial
effect the program has had on their firms. These clients felt there
was a definite relationship between being a client of ADEMI's and the
ability to obtain and retain new customers.
There are three main reasons why. First, stores want references
and ADEMI is considered a good one, not only as proof that the
microfirm is financially sound, which was defined as "not having to
suddenly ask for the payment before the products are delivered," but
also that the owner was trustworthy and reliable. These two
qual ities, but especially the trustworthiness of an individual , were
said to be a major concern among Dominicans.
Second, it was very important to these "tiendas" that their
suppliers have some kind of contact with an institution. As one man
described it:
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The fact that I can give them a phone number
through which to contact me, or that I can give
them a downtown address, or the knowledge that I
can get professional advice from people educated
in universities, gives me an identity very few
people like myself can achieve in this city.
(clothing manufacturer)
Third, the knowledge that, as long as the loans are paid back on
time there will be more coming, has contributed to a feeling of
confidence among these microentrepreneurs. Several people commented
on how much more secure they felt knowning they would have the cash
with which to buy the materials and meet the buyers' contracts.
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1. Peattie (n.d:212)
2. Tendler (1983:126)
3. Peattie (n.d.:126)
4. Ibid.
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CHAPTER FOUR: GRADUATION
One of the objectives of the ADEMI program is to "train
microentrepreneurs in the experience of credit" so that they may
"graduate" to a bank or another lending institution. One aim behind
lending in small but increasing amounts and for short periods is to
minimize the risk of default to the client (and the institution) so
that he or she may establish a good credit record and be considered a
worthy risk by commercial lenders.
ADEMI staff stress the importance of direct contact between a
client and a bank. After a staff person visits the business and
completes an application for the client, the recommended loan amount
is sent to the director of ADEMI for approval. It takes only a few
days for approval and disbursement of the check from ADEMI's account
at the Banco Popular, a private local bank, at which the agency
maintains -a revol v ing loan fund. The first time, a cl ient is
accompanied by a staff person to the bank to famil iarize him or her
with the procedures and to open a savings account, which is required
in order to receive a loan. 1 The client receives subsequent loans at
the ADEMI office and may cash the checks at any one of the Banco
Popular's four branches throughout the city.
The fact that ADEMI does not handle the financial transactions
for the client but a bank does instead, is a way of involving private
banks and "educating" them for different kinds of clients. It al so
reinforces ADEMI's image of an institution which is providing an
answer to the problems of unemployment and lack of growth through
private sector initiatives. ADEMI sees itself as a complement to
institutional credit but as an alternative to informal sector credit.
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A. Releasing the "Good" Clients
ADEMI began by lending only for working capital because its
founders considered it risky to fall into the same "liquidity trap"
other credit programs had fallen into by lending large amounts for
long periods for fixed capital. The reasons were that 1) ADEMI would
forego the possibility of having an efficient revolving fund which was
essential if it became a "massive lending program"; 2) the fund would
decapitalize rapidly and ADEMI would never become self-sufficient, a
goal which is still taken very seriously; 3) the effects of the first
two outcomes would be "demoral izing and disastrous," from which the
organization would not recover; 4) ADEMI would forego the opportunity
to "collaborate" with other programs which lend for fixed capital.2
In other words, ADEMI would not be graduating its clients to other
institutions.
It was stressed that the first few loans to a client were not
expected to satisfy his or her needs for capital, but were intended
to "educate the client in the use of credit." The feel ing was that if
the client was not "trained" to use credit, ADEMI would be unable to
have a high repayment rate. This was because the risk was greater to
the client when he/she got the first loans and it was felt that
risking RD$100 instead of RD$500 was more judicious. Exceptions to
these rules would create precedents, making it more difficult to say
"no" to the next client who might "really" need a loan for fixed
capital.3
Six months after opening its doors, ADEMI was issuing short-term
loans for fixed capital. Several firmowners had requested loans with
which to buy second-hand machines and these were granted. ADEMI said
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that as 1 ong as these 1 oans were for 1 ess than RD$4000 and for no
longer than 4 months, they would not affect the institution's cash
flow, would not raise its transactions or administrative costs, 4 nor
limit the market which ADEMI could serve. With regard to the last
point, ADEMI emphasizes that the majority of the institutions serving
microenterprises in the country work with loans for fixed capital for
periods of a year or more. Since, according to ADEMI, the majority of
microfirms do not need "that type of credit," by offering short-term
loans, ADEMI believes it is working with those at the lowest level. 5
A four-month loan still qualifies as short-term and therefore, ADEMI
has not excluded firms from the market it originally began to serve.
Today, they are still making exceptions to a declared maximum.
There are clients who have received loans between RD$7000 and
RD$15,000 for a period of 6 months. This represents between a 21% and
a 159% real increase in the maximum amount ADEMI will loan to a
cl ient. 6  This has set a precedent for ADEMI to keep raising the
maximum on loans and could theoretically threaten to create the kinds
of problems ADEMI's founders foresaw two years ago. Nonetheless,
because ADEMI has maintained a 92% loan recovery rate and those firms
receiving the larger loans have proven so far that they are able to
pay them back on time, the institution feels justified in continuing
to raise the ceilings on the amount of each loan it makes.
That ADEMI has been issuing increasingly larger loans, however,
gives the impression that it is reluctant to let go of the best
clients and actually see them "graduate" to other banking
institutions. Several months ago, it drafted a list of 50
microenterprises which 1) required more than RD$5000 (US$1500) or 2)
were "el igibl e for a RD$10,000 (US$3000) from the Central Bank's
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Investment Fund for Economic Development (FIDE)." Seven of these,
while remaining as clients of ADEMI's, have received credit from the
Association for Investment and Employment (ASPIRE), a non-profit
Christian development organization affiliated with the International
Institute of Development, Inc. (IIDI) in Washington, D.C. One woman
got a loan from what is popularly known as the Banco de la Mujer, an
affil iate of Women's World Banking, and one person obtained credit
from the Banco Popular, the private bank through which ADEMI issues
loans to its own cl ients.7
B. Alternatives Available to Microenterprises
There are, essentially, four layers of credit markets in the
Dominican Republic: commercial banks regulated by the Central Bank,
nonbank financial intermediaries not subject to portfolio regulations,
private development banks ("financieras"), and moneylenders in the
informal sector. An inflexible ceiling of 12 percent on the official
interest rate has led to differing rates between these sectors. The
"financieras" charge an effective rate of around 36% annually while
commercial banks are allowed to charge up to 17% per year (the 5
points above the ceiling are charged through fees and commissions).
Informal sector moneylenders are unlimited in the interest rates
charged.
From the perspective of a microentrepreneur, there are three
sources of credit available: programs such as ADEMI, which are
regulated by official markets, the private banks, 'and moneylenders.
Programs, such as ADEMI, which are specifically intended for
microentrepreneurs, do the lion's share of the work in the informal
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sector. Several firmowners had not tried to approach the commercial
banks because they said they had ADEMI already, and as long as the
loans kept getting larger, they would remain as ADEMI clients. Another
problem is that commercial banks typically will not lend small amounts
for short periods (less than one year). A third problem stems from a
general scarcity of loanable funds due to low real
Strictly speaking, ADEMI does not offe
fact, by issuing one to six-month loans,
effective annual rate of around 30% instead
on loans of one year or more by commercial
will offer a minimum loan of RD$10,000 to b
interest rate plus 5-6 percentage points to c
RD$4000 loan to be paid back in 4 months, A
(4%) in interest and RD$240 (6%) in closing c
Since the inflation rate is currently
month (36% on an annual basis), however,
interest rates.
r subsidized credit. In
it currently charges an
of the 17% to 18% charged
banks. A commercial bank
e paid in a year at a 12%
over closing costs. On a
DEMI clients pay RD$160
costs.
running at some 3% per
the real interest rates
charged both by commercial banks and ADEMI may be negative. Typically
in this situation, some form of credit rationing must occur. Thus a
good case can be made that commercial bankers will tend to provide
loans to longstanding clients, at the expense of microentrepreneurs.
This is especially true given that smaller loans require higher
closing costs per amount lent.
Penalties for late payment of loans at ADEMI are considered
comparable to a bank's penalities, according to various bank
officials. As discussed earlier, a client who is late for 1-15 days
pays between RD$2.00-RD$5.00 a day plus a 3% monthly interest charge.
After 15 days, legal proceedings begin. The "pagare," a document the
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client has signed in which he or she agrees to terms of the loan, can
be used in court to take legal possession of a client's belongings if
full payment is not made.
According to ADEMI's part-time lawyer, the threat that legal
action will be taken is sufficiently real that very rarely do clients
default on their payments. 8 "The cases which have occurred have been
good examples for people," she said. If a client does not reach a
verbal agreement with the lawyer, the case is taken to court. For
loans under RD$1000, the hearing is scheduled with the Justice of the
Peace and for loans above RD$1000, the case is taken to the Tribunal
Court. The client is given a date on which the loan must be paid.
There have been some cases where clients have missed the deadline
set by the court and ADEMI has sent the sheriff out to the client. A
notice announcing that their belongings will be auctioned off, and
stating the reasons why, is placed on the door "for the neighbors to
see." According to the staff, there has not been a case where the
person has actually lost their belongings. "The person realizes that
he will lose everything if he doesn't pay the loan when he sees his
furniture in our office, ready to go to the auction market," said one
staffperson. One client did have a sewing machine confiscated,
however, said another member of the staff.
Its interest rate pol icy and strict measures to deal with defaul t
loans have reinforced ADEMI's image in the community as a financial
institution, rather than as an organization with social goals. This
image is constantly emphasized by the staff, who argue that it is part
of the process of educating microentrepreneurs in the ways of the
formal sector. Another program, ASPIRE, which is targeted specifically
to microenterprises in the informal sector, however, shares quite a
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different image among firmowners in this sample (specifically, as
being a social organization), which may expl ain why several who
"graduated" from ADEMI did so to this institution rather than to a
formal sector bank. 9
Those firmowners who did look for other sources of credit beyond
ADEMI said they needed larger amounts and longer repayment periods
than what ADEMI offered. 10 The longer repayment periods at ASPIRE
were more flexible and "you don't have to pay so much in interest,"
said one person. A few of those who received loans from ASPIRE said
they had not previously known that they could get a loan of RD$2000
for one year, "only pay 2% a month," and get technical assistance for
"free."11  They felt they were getting a "fairer" deal, although they
still stayed with ADEMI "because you can get the money faster."12
It also seems as if ASPIRE's image as a "social" organization was
linked with the relatively longer repayment periods on its loans.
Owners said they did not worry so much about being "a little" late on
their payments because if they did not pay anything for an "entire"
year, several weeks more would not make much of a difference. This
perception that leniency is associated with long term loans may
provide a partial answer to high default rates experienced by other
credit programs. It is also a clear example of the need to "educate"
someone with the use of credit.
Asked why they had not gone to ASPIRE first, some owners said
that they had to fill out a questionnaire which asked that their fixed
assets be placed as a guarantee against the loan, and they had not
passed the test. One said that he had wanted to start with a smaller
loan (ASPIRE's minimum is RD$1000) in case he couldn't pay it back,
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and others said they had not heard of the program until after they had
borrowed from ADEMI. All said they thought ADEMI was more efficient
and less intimidating because they had almost no paperwork to fill out
and they were given the loan "immediately." Efficiency in loan
disbursements and the lack of intimidation seem to be very important
to these owners. They all said that being able to request a loan one
day and get the check the following day was very necessary in their
business because there were times when they would suddenly need the
cash to buy raw materials or a machine that was on sale, and they
could rely on ADEMI to provide them with it.
The fact that they were not required to fill out "mountains of
paperwork like at other banks" avoided embarrassing moments, they
said. Some said they could not write too well because they had not
"practiced enough." Some said that since they did not know how much
their machines or houses were worth "in detail ," they could not give
that kind of information. "If I go to a bank I will be too ashamed to
let them know I cannot answer their questions. They will then think I
am not good enough for the loan," explained one man.
C. The Transition to Banks
It is difficult to determine at this stage when these successful
firms will be able to become clients of formal sector banks. First,
the fact that some of them see successive loans as a cushion to
weather slumps in demand and price hikes in supply may signal to a
bank that their firms are not entirely financially sound because they
are not making enough to save, or the owner has not been "educated in
the habit of saving." 13 Second, the fact that a bank regulated by the
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government has no choice but to require the "paperwork" may mean that
in order to "graduate," these owners wil l have to be taught or
convinced that they must fill it out. Third, it might be necessary to
wait until the firm accumulates enough capital assets with which to
meet the matching guarantee criterion banks have. A bank will loan
RD$10,000 minimum against RD$10,000 worth in capital assets. To date,
forty percent of those interviewed had met this criterion. Finally,
there is the issue of scarcity of funds due to negative real interest
rates, which may be inducing commercial banks to engage in some form
of credit rationing, to the exclusion of smaller, poorer borrowers.
The issue, in ADEMI's case, may be whether these firms will want
to go to formal banks or not. As long as ADEMI continues to raise its
maximum real amount per loan and to lengthen its repayment periods, it
will have satisfied firmowners' two major complaints about the
program. The longer the loan periods, the less incentive there is to
go to commercial banks. In fact, a bank would represent a less
desirable alternative because it would require a guarantee which ADEMI
presently does not.
77
FOOTNOTES
1. For each loan, a minimum savings account balance of approximately
20% of the loan is required.
2. ADEMI files, April 1983, p. 3.
3. Ibid, p. 2.
4. Issuing a check four times in four months is not more costly than
issuing a check once for one month.
5. ADEMI files, October 1983, p. 2.
6. Real increases were calculated using a price deflator based on
the average inflation rate for 1983 of 7.7%, estimated by the
Central Bank. Only one client has actually received RD$15,000
(US$4500).
7. ADEMI staff were, in general , pessimistic about the ability of
these fifty microentrepreneurs to get financing from the formal
sector. My conversations with the Director of ADEMI on this
subject were extremely brief but, overall, she was optimistic
about their ability, once times got better for all Dominicans.
8. This may be a factor contributing to ADEMI's 92% loan recovery
rate.
9. In a study of women's participation in ADEMI, the author found
that clients were unhappy with the repayment periods because they
were too short (Reichmann, 1984: p.40).
10. I was unable to interview the one person who did get credit from
a bank (Banco Popular).
11. ASPIRE charges an annual interest rate of 12% on the outstanding
balance plus a 12% fixed fee on the principal per year which goes
toward technical assistance. They are lumped together and since
clients do not pay a monthly fee (as they do for technical
assistance at ADEMI), they think it is free.
12. It sometimes takes 4-5 weeks to get a loan from ASPIRE because
applications must be approved by their Washington office. It
takes 2 days at most to get the check from ADEMI.
13. Even though ADEMI requires clients to keep a savings account,
these are often drawn down to RD$50.00 (US$15.00 at US$1.00 =
RD$3.00) regardless of the amount of the loan. Some clients save
1.5% of their loans instead of the 20% required.
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CHAPTER FIVE: STAGES OF GROWTH
This chapter provides an analysis of a microfirm's development
process from the time it is conceived as an idea by the owner to where
it has secured contracts with formal sector firms for its supplies of
raw materials and markets for its products. Three stages of growth
were defined based upon the findings presented in Chapters One through
Four. Firms were divided into these three stages according to how
long they had been in operation. Owners consistently related the
various changes their firms experienced to this length-of-operation
criterion. The stages were also defined by who the firms' suppliers
were, to whom the firms sold their products, and what the firms' needs
were for labor.
The first stage is defined to include firms which have been in
operation for an average of 1.5 years with a range of one to two
years. The eight firms in the sample which fell into this group were
selling primarily to street vendors and individuals within their
neighborhood, were buying from small local retail suppliers, and
depended heavily upon nonremunerated family labor and young
apprentices. They were using their loans primarily for raw
materials.
The second stage is comprised of firms which have been in
operation for an average of 5.2 years with a range of 3 to 8 years.
The ten firms in the sample which fell into this group had begun
selling to medium-sized stores or "tiendas" in the central commercial
district of Santo Domingo, and had begun buying their supplies at
wholesale prices from larger firms. Some of the firms in this stage
had adopted the hiring-firing "technique" described in Chapter One in
79
which employees are released before they become eligible for the legal
minimum wage and benefits.
Stage Three includes firms in operation for an average of 16
years with a range of 12-25 years. The four firms in the sample which
fell into this group had had contracts with the "tiendas" for a while
and some of the firms had begun selling to boutiques, stores which
cater to the upper classes in Santo Domingo. Firms in this group had
solidified their relationships with the larger suppliers and some even
bought supplies from importers. These firmowners were found to use
credit more frequently to raise a worker's salary or hire a new
ski I ed worker than did owners of firms in the other two stages.
Following the analysis of a microfirm's development process, the
role of a credit program in each of these stages is examined. This
portion of the analysis is also based upon the findings discussed in
Chapters One through Four.
A. Preparing for Self-Employment
For those who had previously worked in large factories, the
average number of years of experience in the field before they started
their own business was less than for those who had worked in smaller
formal sector firms or informal microfirms. The main reason seemed to
be due to the difference in the ability to accumulate capital. Most
shoe manufacturers in the sample were previously employed by larger
factories and had an average of 15 years work experience whereas
clothing manufacturers and artisans who came primarily from
microenterprises, had an average of 22 years of experience in the
field. A factory worker is more likely to get severance pay than a
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microfirm worker and often times this is col 1 ected to start a firm.
Another factor which seemed to play an important role in the decision
to set up a business was the ability to attract customers. Many
owners began their businesses while still working. Those who had
worked in microenterprises considered the lack of customers as a more
important problem than those who had had a higher paying job. The
extra capital seemed to provide the security or, at least the feeling
of security, that those coming from the microenterprises did not have.
Instead, the latter emphasized the ability to "steal" the customers
away as the crucial "turning point" at which they decided to leave the
job and devote themselves entirely to the new business. Taking
business away from a microenterprise is probably a more realistic
endeavor than from a factory, anyway. A worker in a factory has
little, if any, direct contact with the clientele, unlike someone
working in a microenterprise. Furthermore, the market which a new
informal sector business is likely to sell to is not the same one the
larger factory is catering to. Indeed the "contacts" made was seen as
a unique advantage to working as an apprentice in a microfirm.
B. Stage I: The Birth of the Firm and its "Days of Struggle"
1. "Natural Advantages"
The first years of a firm's life are marked by a unique reliance
upon what can be called its "natural advantages:" the availability of
family labor, second-hand equipment, neighborhood markets, recycled
raw materials, flexibility, and lack of administrative complexity.
Owners describe these times, which lasted from one to two years as
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"days of struggle," where the family works many hours to keep the
business going and "keep the bread on the table." Family members
carry out the tasks that workers hired from outside take on in later
stages. More frequently one of the spouses does the selling while the
other makes the product with the sons and/or daughters. The workshop
is set up in the back and customers drop by to have tea and purchase a
pair of shoes or a dress they have ordered. Sometimes wives spend
entire afternoons attending one customer. Business is done locally
where customers come to the shop instead of the shop seeking out the
customers. There is no time to look for customers, owners explain,
because "... then who would make the shoes?"
One of the advantages to selling to local customers is that they
buy goods which are made out of cheap, lower quality, and often
recycled materials, the only kind the firm at its early stages can
afford to purchase. The shoemaker's ability to create "everything out
of anything" means the firm is able to generate enough to buy more raw
materials and cover basic family expenses. No salaries are paid
because family members contribute their labor when they get home from
a job or if unemployed, devote themselves full time to it. Some sons
and daughters even leave jobs to help the parents with the business.
The owner devotes himself entirely to production because there is
little need for administration.
The earliest stage of a firm generally means no more than a
subsistence wage for the owner. The owner is challenged with daily
problems but the belief that the firm will eventually bring in more
income than what the owner was making before self-employment
encourages him or her to continue. As the microentrepreneur learns
more about his competitors who, at this stage, are microfirms of
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similar size, he begins to find out where others buy their materials
and how to get the "good" customers. The psychological benefit of
being "your own boss" weighs heavily in favor of hanging on and
eventually "subsistence" becomes the way of life of other
microentrepreneurs.
2. Beyond Subsistence and toward Stabilization
Probably the greatest change a firm experiences is when it begins
to replace family labor with paid workers from outside. Members,
particularly the offspring, often go on to other things if they have
the opportunity, once the firm begins to generate enough income to
hire people. The prime motivation for hiring non-family members is
that the product is selling well and the owner wants to increase
production to meet the growing demand and needs more help. When
relatives do stay around they assume positions of responsibility,
which generally means leaving the production process. They will do
the bookkeeping, or handle the cash, take over the selling duties,
etc.
One of the factors which allows a microentrepreneur to hire wage
labor is the large number of youth and unemployed persons seeking a
way to make a living. These groups are willing to take very low wages
and accept no guarantee of job security in exchange for employment as
apprentices. Another factor is the ability to break away from
microfirm suppliers who are unreliable and costly providers of raw
materials. In some cases, this involves relationships with new
customers.
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The hypothesis that microenterprises survive because they do not
observe minimum wage and social security laws, do not pay fringe
benefits or observe the eight hour work day, and so on, is certainly
found to be true for these microentrepreneurs. At this stage, when
the firm is just barely beyond subsistence, "reaching for stability"
as one interviewee described it, apprentices are brought in to do the
work and the firmowner teaches them and supervises them. Often times
one will find the owner carrying out the more complex tasks in the
production process while one or two boys do the simpler tasks. For
example, shoe manufacturers described when they used to design the
shoes, cut the leather, sew the uppers and the apprentices put the
heels on, maybe sewed the uppers to the soles, shine the shoes and
package them. Among artisans, apprentices mixed the clays, cleaned
the shop, put the clay into the molds and the owner would glaze and
paint the pieces.
Once the firm brings in people from the outside it begins to rely
on them. Losing an employee when there are only two or three can set
a firm back considerably, yet the owner is unable to pay more in wages
to entice them to stay. This seems to be a true matter of survival
for the firm and not a deliberate policy of exploitation on the part
of the owner.
As increased production of the firm brings in more income, the
owner typically invests it in more labor. This is where the hiring-
firing "technique" described in Chapter One seems to be adopted by
some. Rather than retain workers by paying them higher wages, owners
hire more and tend to keep them until they become eligible for
severance pay, fringe benefits, or the legal minimum wage. The
rationale given is that once an employee is earning the minimum, the
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owner no longer has the flexibility to lower the wage in bad times.
Firing an employee after he or she gets double the equivalent of a
two-week salary in one lump sum is an impossible payment for the firm
given its illiquid state.
It seems that the hiring-firing "technique" is a reaction to the
firm's slight loss in one of its "natural advantages": flexibility.
Owners cope with seasonal slumps in demand by buying fewer raw
materials. This amounts to a reduction in the cost of production.
When labor becomes part of these costs, the firm needs the same kind
of flexibility. In this case, in order to reduce the cost of the
labor input, owners must avoid the penalty associated with it once it
becomes more "fixed" in nature, which is when a worker becomes legally
eligible for certain minimum benefits. So, owners keep apprentices
until they have worked for six months at which time they become
"operarios" (skilled workers), eligible for the minimum wage and thus
"fixed." At this time they are released.
Many apprentices agree to less than the minimum in exchange for
various Christmas bonuses, family help when needed, and emergencies.
Some owners were proud to tell me about how they had "conspired" with
their employees not to tell the authorities that they had been working
there for more than three months. The abil ity to do that means the
owner has a good relationship with his workers, something to be proud
of. It is when the firm has a larger labor force that the hiring-
firing "technique" described in Chapter One seems necessary because
the owner has less time to nurture his relationships with the workers.
Another factor which allows a microenterprise to add to its labor
force is its ability to lower the costs of raw materials. This means
85
acquiring some "extra" income which the owner can use to buy materials
in larger quantities at wholesale prices. Often times the way a firm
gets this "extra" income is to find a customer who will buy more than
one or two pairs of shoes or who will order a couple of dozen dresses.
Some owners take the merchandise to stores, trying to get these to
place an order. Others sell to the "buhoneros," street vendors, who
sit in front of the stores along the main avenues. While these do not
buy as much as stores do, they do represent an improvement over the
occasional customer from within the neighborhood.
Sometimes getting enough money together to buy a large order of
cloth or leather requires resorting to a friend, relative or the
infamous neighborhood moneylender. Herein lies the main rationale
behind credit programs such as ADEMI. Without access to institutional
credit, owners must pay daily interest rates of up to 20%, which often
leaves them without any money to reinvest, defeating the whole purpose
behind setting aside the "extra" income. With programs that are
willing to lend at lower rates such as 2%-3% a month, the firm is able
to secure raw materials at bulk prices thereby lowering its costs and
after paying the loan back, the firm is left with enough profit with
which to reinvest and actually expand its production.
C. Stage II: Stabilization
Once a firm is able to buy raw materials in such quantities so as
to reduce the per unit cost of this input, it is on its way toward
stabilization. The "days of struggle" come to an end when an owner no
longer is solely reliant upon buying small quantities of inputs at
small retail firms or individuals. As discussed in Chapter Two, these
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firms work to the advantage of the manufacturer in his early stages
because they are willing to sell in small quantities, the buyer-seller
relationship is close and informal providing the flexibility (for
example, credit) needed in times of trouble, and their close proximity
minimizes transportation costs. However, the reliance upon these
small suppliers maintains the firm at the subsistence level because it
can barely cover the costs of the materials at the prices offered.
The goal of the owner is to break away from these firms, which as
"middlemen," cover the costs of dealing in small quantities by selling
raw materials at prices above those offered by larger retail or
wholesale firms in either sector.
Owners said that half the battle was over once they were able to
buy raw materials from 1 arger stores. The wider variety stocked by
larger suppliers cuts down on the numerous trips across the city in
search of one thing or another. Owners worry less over whether they
will be able to get certain items because these suppliers carry more
clout than smaller ones which means they have less difficulty with
obtaining the materials. Larger suppliers also provide an opportunity
to make contact with larger stores who buy products sold by these
microenterprises. For those firms which use imported raw materials,
buying from larger suppliers means more reliable delivery dates, fewer
chances of getting stolen goods, and relatively lower prices.
Along with a gradual switch to larger suppliers, growing firms
reach out beyond the neighborhood in search of larger markets. The
lower cost of raw inputs and the growing number of apprentices in
these workshops push the firms' production possibilities curve to
where they are able to produce larger and larger quantities. In
general , it selects one or two variations of the same product, for
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example, two styles of ladies' footwear, and produces these in volume
for the longer stores. The firm continues to sell to individual
customers the styles it always produced but this market is no longer
its only source of income.
The market that is sought after is the growing working class
which includes low and middle income populations. These consumers do
their shopping primarily along the Avenida Duarte, a commercial strip
lined with "tiendas" (medium size stores) and bustl ing with street
vendors. The "tiendas" sell at prices considered affordable by many
Dominicans, thus satisfying the needs of the majority of the
population. It is to these that firmowners turn to sell their
products.
Chapter Three describes the various advantages and disadvantages
associated with this move and, at first glance, one might think the
firm is worse off supplying these "tiendas." First, most of these
firms are located far from the central commercial district where the
larger stores are found. In order to deliver the goods, then, firms
need transportation which is often difficult to obtain. Second, these
stores buy from the microfirms at wholesale prices, retaining the
profit the microfirms would get if they sold retail. Third,
competition is keener when sel 1 ing to the "tiendas," according to
owners, because the large domestic producers of shoes clothing, etc.
al so sell to these "tiendas." Fourth, some of the younger firms
interviewed complained that the "tiendas" often do not pay on time or
that their checks bounce. They had not switched to "tiendas" because
they were less profitable or because "the larger microfirms already
sell to them anyway."
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From the perspective of owners of older firms, however, buying
from larger suppliers and selling to the "tiendas" is highly desirable
and necessary if the firm is to bring in the kind of money that will
improve the owner's standard of living and that of the workers.
Securing contracts with these stores is a means through which a
microfirm controls its environment. "Tiendas" reduce the
uncertainties caused by seasonal fluctuations in demand because they
will buy enough merchandise from the firm to allow it to continue at a
steady rate of production. Having reached this "plateau" in which a
firm can count on a minimum monthly income, it is able to diversify
into more lucrative markets.
D. Stage III: The Safe Road of Expansionf
By this stage, a firm has begun generating sufficient income to
provide for the owner's family, to keep investing in increasing
amounts of raw materials, to continue hiring more workers, and to
begin accumulating fixed capital. Selling to the "tiendas" means
improving the quality of the product above that of what is produced
for local neighborhood markets because the microfirm is now competing
with formal sector producers. This change requires the use of more
skil led labor which leads to discontinuing the hiring-firing
"technique" practiced by some. The loss of trained workers through
this method becomes too costly for the firm. In addition, some firms
want to use imported raw materials to improve the quality of the
goods. In order to gain access to these inputs a firm must purchase
them from formal sector importers who require proof of sales. This is
a strong incentive to become legalized.
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Chapter One describes how firm owners began "discovering" the
costs of not paying employees the minimum wage and benefits required
by law and improving general working conditions when they had decided
to improve the qual ity of their product or they needed to delegate
some responsibility or, as in one case, the owner needed to protect
his merchandise. "Legalizing" an employee is the way owners reduce
costs such as stolen merchandise or lack of skilled emloyees to make a
product of a higher quality which, from their perspective, outweigh
the additional costs incurred by increasing wages and providing
benefits. Even so, owners find it difficul t to retain skilled
employees because many leave to up set their own shops. Other cases
studies have found similar shortages of skilled labor facing
microfirms.
While it is certainly true that self-employment leads many
skilled workers away from microfirms (the same owners are an example
of that), it is also plausible that workers leave because of the
limited opportunities for upward mobility within these firms. This
hypothesis is supported by what owners themselves described in
interviews. Owners who do not think about sharing responsibilities
with their top worker(s) say they would rather have a family member
take over the major duties such as cash and sales because they cannot
trust any outsiders. They say employees are not interested in more
responsibilities but the employees, in turn, say they never consider
it because they are never asked. With two exceptions, owners who were
thinking about delegating responsibility outside family circles had
not done it yet and when employees were casually asked if they aspired
to becoming assistants to the owner, they said they did but that they
had no hope for any change in their present status because they had
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been there for years and nothing had happened yet. One employee said
the owner had complained about management problems periodically for as
long as he could remember, and to this day he was in the same position
he was three years ago.
The reluctance of owners to reduce their control over the
enterprise is more noticeable at this stage of a firm's growth because
it is here that the managerial and administrative tasks of handling
20-40 employees, numerous contracts with "tiendas" and suppl iers, and
now the introduction of credit (ADEMI) are often overwhelming for a
single owner to handle. It is at this stage that an owner feel s the
most need for someone to take over some of the tasks such as handling
the daily cash box, for example.
Accumulation of machinery is considered a healthy sign of growth
among firm owners, as was described in Chapter One. Owners may
accumulate machines to the point where there may be several that lay
idle. Many invest their loans directly into a machine that will carry
out a special ized task. The "natural advantage" of using second-hand
machinery allows this firm to produce at a lower cost than a firm
using the higher priced "modern" machine. It also allows the firm to
gain a competitive edge over other microfirms who are not yet beyond
the stage of "sustenance." Machines not only increase labor
productivity but they attract the "good" customers and suppliers who
apparently keep a watchful eye over these firms, they provide security
to the owner in the sense that the machines can be sold, and they
attract the better workers who look for chances to learn new skills.
When a firm leaves the neighborhood in search of larger markets,
it walks directly into formal sector territory. From the firm owner's
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perspective, the first "penetration" into this territory occurs when
he or she secures contracts with some of the "tiendas" to whom the
larger domestic producers also sell. This is followed by a period in
which the firm "consolidates" its position as a reliable supplier of
goods to a number of stores which, as time goes by, develop "close"
relationships with the microfirm and become its "loyal" customers.
Those owners who live to tell of the experience are very proud of
being a good friend of Mr. X on the Avenida. Firms still keep their
makeshift stores in the front of their homes but the sales from these
are minimal.
The second "penetration" occurs when the firm is ready to sel 1 a
1ine of shoes or clothing of finer qual ity to the "boutiques" in the
city. These retail stores are special because they sell to the more
affluent middle and upper classes. They pay much more than the
"tiendas" do because they sel 1 their merchandise at much higher prices
than those afforded by lower and middle income Dominicans. Selling
to boutiques means competing with imported goods in addition to those
produced by larger domestic producers. While only a few firms in the
sample have actually sold some of their product to boutiques, owners
are generally optimistic about facing the new competition. As
discussed in Chapter Three, owners see their chances improving as long
as the government continues its present policies to alleviate the
balance of payments deficit. Reducing imports of final consumption
goods means that these boutiques will begin substituting domestically
produced goods. The microfirms' "natural advantages" of using
domestic and recycled raw materials will allow them to undercut larger
firms' prices. To the extent that tariff exemptions on imported
intermediate inputs are removed and that larger firms depend more
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heavily on these imported inputs and therefore on this "subsidy,"
larger manufacturing firms' costs of production will rise forcing
them to raise prices in the short run.
Perhaps, theoretically, these microfirm owners have a good case.
Realistically, however, the competition is by no means easy. Those
firms in the sample which have contracts with the "tiendas" have been
operating for at least five years. The two firms which have recently
begun selling small amounts of merchandise to the boutiques have been
in operation for 16 years. A monthly inflation rate of 3% in 1985 and
repeated devaluations of the peso have caused sharp rises in the cost
of these microfirms' inputs to where many firms have adopted a "sit
and wait" attitude, i.e., they are happy to keep selling enough to
live off of and not expanding their workshops or their labor force.
Interestingly, the recession has had little effect in changing the
common perception that there is an "infinite" demand within each
income class. The difficulty is still perceived as being the initial
entry or "penetration" to the market.
E. THE ROLE OF CREDIT
Having outlined the stages of a microfirm's development process,
we now turn to an analysis of the effects of a credit program upon
each of these stages.
In the first few years of a microfirm's existence one can expect
credit to be used both for the purchase of raw materials and for
family or personal consumption. The amount of raw materials purchased
would be limited by how much assistance the owner gets from the family
in terms of labor and by how much of the loan is used to satisfy
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urgent personal needs. Based upon interviews, owners recalled having
to borrow money from neighborhood lenders to feed their family because
they had spent what little they had on making their product and this
had not been sold yet. Using the loans for family emergencies,
however, would not automatically imply defaulting on the loans because
there are cases in which the owner holds on to a job during these
early years of the business. Also, spouses may contribute to
household income by dividing their time between the business and a job
outside the home. The challenge is to maintain a minimum level of
liquidity so that access to a loan from an institution like ADEMI,
i.e., at more affordable rates than those offered by the moneylender,
would mean the owner would have cash left over to invest in more raw
materials without jeopardizing his family's well-being.
As word gets around the neighborhood about the new establ ishment,
business picks up and sales increase. At this point, credit can
expect to contribute increasingly to enlarging the workforce of the
firm because at this stage paid labor, mostly in the form of
apprentices, gradually replaces family labor. Owners who had been in
business for an average of 19 years described how in their first years
in business, they invested every "chele" (penny) into hiring more
workers so they could keep up with the demand they had no idea existed
in their neighborhoods. Owners who had been in business for an
average of 2 years at the time of the study said they had used the
loans primarily to hire "many workers and buy more raw materials."
A firm which has been successful in its early stages can al so be
expected to invest the credit in increasing amounts of raw materials
in an effort to begin purchasing at wholesale prices. The push away
from a reliance on small retail suppliers is an attempt to reduce the
94
cost of this input as the firm increases the total cost of the other
variable input, labor. Owners of older firms described how they were
"lucky" to have borrowed money from the local lender or a relative or
had sold a larger vol ume than usual because with the "extra" income
they had been able to buy raw materials at a lower cost. Programs
such as ADEMI, dissolve the microfirm's "natural disadvantage" of
having to borrow from a moneylender and enable it to reduce this cost
sooner than it could without such a program.
The search for larger markets beyond the neighborhood is in part
a firm's response to the same "natural disadvantage" it has of not
having access to affordable credit. The "extra" income is sought by
securing contracts with the "tiendas," as was discussed earl ier. At
this point, credit plays a role in the firm's ability to secure these
contracts. The fact that the owner owes money to an organization
enhances his image as a trustworthy and reliable individual.
Microfirm owners are more willing to accept an order from the
"tiendas" because they can be confident that they (the owners) will
have the money with which to buy the raw materials. Credit, in this
case, would facilitate the expansion of a microfirm by improving its
chances to establish or strengthen links with larger businesses.
Selling to the "tiendas" involves a change in the quality of the
goods being produced. The result is a growing need for skilled labor
which marks the end of the hiring-firing "technique" practiced in some
firms. The accumulation of fixed capital has already begun and owners
become increasingly preoccupied over finding the skilled workers to
run the machines. The incentive to legalize becomes stronger to the
extent that it attracts the better workers and it facilitates dealing
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with importers from whom some microfirms begin to purchase their raw
materials (to increase the quality of the merchandise). Owners also
feel more "vulnerable" to the penalties associated with violating the
law as their firms grow larger and become more intricately involved
with formal sector economic institutions.
There seem to be more variations in the way credit is used among
firms which are in Stage III. Some firms invest a portion of their
loans in workers' salaries in an effort to keep the "good" employees.
Others use them to repair or buy machinery. A few spend the loans on
imported raw materials which in some cases are more expensive than the
domestic equivalents. Some owners buy their licenses to become legal.
Loans are also spent on marketing the products such as newspaper or
radio advertising or buying fancier packaging materials.
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CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
This thesis is an analysis of the role of credit in the changing
structures of successful informal -sector manufacturing firms and their
relationships with buyers and sellers in the rest of the economy.
Twenty-four firmowners, clients of the Association for the Development
of Microenterprises, Inc. (ADEMI), were interviewe in-depth in Santo
Domingo, Dominican Republic over a period of one and a half months. A
firm's changing needs for labor, its different sources of supply, the
different markets for its products and its ability to 'graduate' to
commercial bank credit are analyzed over time as the firm grows.
Three stages of development of a microfirm are then identified based
upon these findings. The following is a summary of the findings
discussed in Chapters One through Five.
A. CHAPTER ONE: LABOR
1. Owners who had worked as apprentices in factories or larger firms
prior to setting up their own businesses found that the training
provided by their former employers was, in general , inappropriate
for running their own firms. Their own firms were at a much
smaller scale and level of development than were the larger firms
they used to work for. The ability to accumulate savings for
start-up capital was considered the main advantage to working for
someone el se.
2. Owners who had worked as apprentices for microenterprises before
self-employment found their training useful but had more
difficulty accumulating capital, given the lower wages offered by
these firms relative to those offered by larger factories. The
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ability to attract customers away from their former employers,
however, was considered a substantial advantage to having worked
as apprentices for microfirms.
3. Young apprentices comprised at least 50% of the workforces of the
firms in this study. Firm owners based their decisions to hire
an apprentice primarily upon the latter's honesty and integrity.
The reputation of the apprentice's parents and his friends
influences the owner's judgement about the young person's honesty
and integrity.
4. By and large, apprentices work faster than do the trained workers
because the former are paid at piece-rates whereas the latter are
salaried.
5. A firm's legal status is considered a separate issue from the
decision to "legalize" an employee, i.e., to observe the labor
laws. The decision to "legalize" an employee was influenced by
the firm's 1abor requirements and its abil ity to pay the minimum
wage, and benefits.
6. Most firms are unable to pay minimum wage and benefits in their
earlier stages of development. Some of them adopt what is
referred to in the text as the "hiring-firing" technique in which
employees are released every 3 to 6 months before they become
"operarios" or skilled workers, entitled to the legal wage and
benefits. As these firms grow and begin supplying stores which
require merchandise of a higher quality, they abandon the
"technique" because they can no longer afford to release the
trained workers.
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7. When asking a firmowner about employee turnover, the interviewer
should know which stage of the firm's growth the owner is
referring to. In this study, when the question about turnover
rates was first posed, everybody complained that workers left
after they were trained, also found to be true among UNO clients
in Brazil (Tendler, 1983). Once the interview focused on an
earlier episode in the history of the firm, however, it was
discovered that high turnover rates were encouraged, a finding
consistent with that of Peatties (n.d.) study of Colombian shoe
manufacturers.
8. A firm may have difficulty retaining skilled employees because a)
it may not be paying high enough wages relative to other firms;
b) the firm offers limited opportunities to employees for upward
mobility into, for example, managerial responsibilities, because
the owner is reluctant to relinquish control of the firm; and c)
workers leave to set up their own shops because of the high
potential earnings relative to those of a wage earner and the
psychological appeal of being your own boss.
9. Male owners had their spouses do the bookkeeping, pay the bills,
and sell the product whereas female owners more frequently had a
relative other than their spouses perform these duties or did
them themsel ves.
10. The general perception among firmowners is that the health of
their firm is reflected by the number of machines it has.
Machinery is accumulated as a hedge against inflation, currently
running at 36% a year. Fixed capital is used to attract the
larger contracts from suppliers and buyers who, according to
firmowners, visit their workshops to assess their firm's
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productive capacity. Machinery also attracts the better workers
who look for the opportunity to learn new skills.
11. In most of these microfirms machinery lies idle. This is due to
employee absenteeism, an inability to repair the machines due to
the lack of space parts and/or the know-how, a shortage of
skilled labor, and frequent power outages. Idle machinery,
however, is not considered a cost to the firm because of the role
it plays in attracting clients and workers and because the
machines are used for twice as long as their "normal" or
"expected" life span, so that the marginal cost of idle machines
may really be nearly zero.
12. ADEMI, as do other credit programs, strictly relies upon the
number of employees as an indicator of a firm's grwoth and pays
little, if any, attention to the skill level or productivity of
labor. Firmowners in this study, on the other hand, pay closer
attention to the productivity of their employees. The result is
that firmowners feel pressured to hire more employees to remain
in good standing as clients even though hiring more workers may
not make economic sense to them.
13. The risk in overemphasizing growth of numbers of employed and in
disregarding the skill level of a firm's employees is that
incorrect decisions can be made as to who is worthy of a loan and
who is not. Slow growth of a firm's labor force might be due to
the replacement of apprentices with experienced workers. A loan
criterion which emphasizes enlargment of the workforce may
conceal a low level of productivity. In the first case, an
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opportunity would be lost and in the second case a bad loan would
be made.
B. CHAPTER TWO: LINKS WITH SUPPLIERS
1. When informal sector manufacturing firms are first established,
they often are solely reliant upon buying small quantities of
inputs at small retail firms or from individuals. The advantages
of buying from these small suppliers are that they are willing to
sell in small quantities, the buyer-seller relationship is close
and informal providing flexibility (for example, credit) needed
in times of trouble, and their close proximity minimizes
transportation costs.
2. The goal of firmowners in manufacturing, however, is to break
away from the small retail suppliers and to purchase their raw
materials from larger stores. In later stages of growth, firms
buy from larger suppliers due to their ability to offer quantity
discounts, their reliability of supply, their diversity of
supply, the quality of their merchandise, and because they can
provide introductions to customers. Those interviewed did not
view the relationship with large suppliers as one of dependency
but in fact felt then when their firms were young they were at
the mercy of the smaller retail suppliers.
3. Smaller firms may increase their market shares relative to large
firms due to he introduction of IMF austerity programs. Large
domestic manufacturers are granted exemptions on import tariffs
which is a way of subsidizing these firms. Microfirms, on the
other hand, are not granted exemptions which means they do not
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get access to low-tariff inputs. In other words, they do not
benefit from the subsidy. Under austerity measures, the
government would be reducing the number of imported inputs
eligible for exemptions. In the short run, large firms using
these inputs would see their costs rising and would be forced to
raise their prices. Microfirms which rely mostly upon domestic
inputs would find that their costs were not rising as quickly due
to the removal of such subsidies, however. The ability to keep
their prices below those of larger firms would enable the
microfi rms to penetrate markets prev iousl y control l ed by the
1arger firms.
4. Loans for raw materials help microfirms lower their input costs
by enabling them to gain access to larger suppliers. The ability
to get contracts with larger suppliers is often based upon
whether a microfirm can buy larger quantities of raw materials.
The lack of money to purchase these is often a severe bottleneck
to the firm's development.
5. The link with a lending institution increases the confidence
among these larger suppliers to sign contracts with microfirms.
For example, microfirmowners said that some suppliers were more
likely to extend credit once in a while now that they (the
owners) had become ADEMI clients.
C. CHAPTER THREE: UNSATURATED AND UNTAPPED MARKETS
1. The general perception among microentrepreneurs is that there is
"infinite" demand for their products. The challenge lies in
penetrating the market initially. Supply factors such as the
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rising costs of inputs and the shortage of skilled labor make
diversification into new products to be sold in new markets a
very difficult task for the firm.
2. When the firm is first established, it sells to individual
customers and street vendors. As it grows, it begins selling to
medium sized stores because these represent a steadier demand
than do individual customers: the owner knows at least 15 days
in advance that a minimum amount of merchandise will be sold.
3. The goal of some firmowners is to begin selling to the boutiques
which cater to the higher income classes. These stores buy
products at higher prices than do the "tiendas" (1arger retail
stores) because they sell these products at higher prices to
people who are willing to pay more than those shopping at the
"tiendas."
4. Opportunities to reach these stores, which cater to the more
affluent markets of Santo Domingo, were believed to improve under
austerity measures because boutiques would begin replacing
imported final goods with domestic equivalents. The larger
domestic producers would see the cost of their inputs rising, and
to the extent that this would force them to raise their prices,
they would present significantly less competition to microfirms
in the short run than under normal circumstances.
5. Having contact with a formal sector credit institution such as
ADEMI gives a firmowner an identity which facilitates contact
with formal sector buyers of his goods. First, buyers want
references as proof that the microfirm owner is a trustworthy and
reliable individual. This increases the likelihood that
contracts will be honored. Second, the difficulty of contacting
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the owner of a microfirm who otherwise would be hard to reach,
because he either has no phone or he is located far from the
buyers, is reduced when he is linked to an institution which is
located downtown and can be reached by phone. Third, the access
to credit (provided each loan is paid back) gives the microfirm
owner confidence that he will be able to meet an order from a
buyer because he will have the cash with which to buy the
necessary raw materials.
D. CHAPTER FOUR: GRADUATION
1. ADEMI gives the impression that it is reluctant to let go of its
best cl ients and see them "graduate" to other banking
institutions because it keeps satisfying clients' only complaint
of the program by lengthening the repayment periods and enlarging
the amounts of the loans, a policy which was strictly avoided by
ADEMI's founders two years ago. ADEMI began by lending short-
term loans (1-3 months) of small amounts (RD$100-300) and for
working capital only with the intention of passing its clients
onto other insitutions once they required larger loans for fixed
capital. To date, however, ADEMI continues to raise the maximum
amount it lends and to lengthen the repayment periods and has
begun lending for fixed capital. Some of ADEMI's best clients
are currently borrowing up to RD$15,000 for a period of over six
months. Given this policy, clients have had no reason to
graduate.
2. A few of those firmowners who did seek loans from other
institutions, went to the Association for Investment and
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Employment (ASPIRE), a non-profit development organization in
Santo Domingo, which offers relatively larger loans for even
longer repayment periods. The long repayment period (minimum of
one year) was considered a sign of leniency by owners, who
believed that being "a little" late on their payments would not
make much of a difference if they had had the loans for over a
year. That leniency is associated with long term loans may
provide a partial answer to high default rates experienced by
other credit programs. It is also an example of the need to
"educate" borrowers with the use of credit.
3. It is difficult to determine whether successful firms can
graduate to commercial or public sector banks. Bankers are
reluctant to lend to firmowners who talk about using their loans
to carry them through slumps in demand or price hikes in supply,
because this indicates a severe problem of liquidity. Paperwork,
which firmowners are reticent or unable to complete, must be
processed and the risky nature of the firms forces a bank to
stick to its minimum matching guarantee criterion in which a firm
must match the amount of the loan with the value of its fixed
capital assets. Most commercial banks are bound to this rule by
government law. Finally, the shortage of loanable funds in the
economy, caused by negative real interest rates, may be inducing
banks to engage in some form of credit rationing to the exclusion
of smaller, poorer borrowers.
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E. CHAPTER FIVE: STAGES OF GROWTH
This chapter provided an analysis of a microfirm's development
process through time. Three stages were defined based upon the
findings discussed in Chapters One through Four.
1. Stage I of the firm's life is marked by a unique reliance upon
its "natural advantages": the availability of cheap and/or
unpaid family labor, second-hand equipment, neighborhood markets,
recycled raw materials, and administrative flexibility. These
are the "days of struggle" in which a firm buys raw materials in
small quantities at high unit costs and sells to individuals and
small firms in small quantities. The main advantage of selling
to local customers is that they buy goods which are made out of
cheap, lower quality, and often recycled materials, the only kind
the firm at its early stages can afford to purchase. The small
suppliers also work to the advantage of the manufacturer in his
early stages because they are wil1ing to sel1 in small
quantities, as discussed earlier.
2. Stage II is defined as the period of stabilization in which a
microfirm secures contracts with larger suppliers and larger
customers. These changes mean a more reliable and cheaper supply
of inputs and a more reliable source of demand for the microfirm.
Larger suppliers stock a wider variety of inputs, have less
difficulty obtaining materials than do smaller firms, and provide
an opportunity for microfirm owners to make contact with buyers
from larger stores. Larger stores, i.e., the "tiendas" described
in Chapter Three, reduce the uncertainty caused by seasonal
fluctuations in demand because they will buy enough merchandise
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from the firm to allow it to continue at a steady rate of
production. The change to supplying these larger stores requires
the use of more skilled labor (because they demand a higher
quality product) which leads to discontinuing the hiring-firing
"techniques" practiced by some, as described in Chapter One.
3. By Stage III, the firm has cemented its links with formal sector
firms which form the basis for a secure path of expansion into
different markets, such as "boutiques" which cater primarily to
the upper-middle class in Santo Domingo.
4. Credit seems to play different primary roles depending on the
stage of development of a firm. In its early stages, one can
expect credit to be used for the purchase of raw materials and
for personal consumption. In Stage II, firms spend their loans
on hiring more workers and buying raw materials. Credit also
seems to facilitate securing contracts with larger stores because
being affiliated with an institution enhances the credibility of
an owner with the buyer. ADEMI, in this case, provides an
identity to its clients and the fact that ADEMI is willing to
issue loans to them is usually enough proof to the buyer that his
supplier (the microfirm owner) is a trustworthy and reliable
individual. Firms in Stage III seem to invest a larger portion
of their loans in worker's salaries in an effort to keep the
skilled employees. A few spend their loans on more expensive
imported raw materials and a few invest them in marketing and
packaging their products.
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APPENDIX A: ANALYSIS OF ADEMI DATA
Data on microenterprises funded by ADEMI were analyzed using
statistical techniques to provide empirical underpinnings to the
findings of this research. Briefly, cross-sectional data were obtained
on each of 41 ADEMI firms at the time of the receipt of each loan (see
Table A-3). Each of the firms studied had received at least 9 loans,
ranging in period of repayment of from one to four months.
Generally longer repayment periods were awarded once the borrower
had successfully repaid several short-term loans. Variables observed
for each firm included the loan value (or debt, since the borrower was
interviewed in each case after having completely retired the previous
loan) and dates on which the loans were disbursed and due. At the
beginning of each loan disbursement, owners were questioned concerning
the size of their workforces, the value of their fixed capital,
monthly wage bills, materials used, and sales.
Variables were stated in current pesos, so that construction of
an inflation index was necessary. Both the IMF International
Financial Statistics and the United Nations Bulletin of Statistics
were used to calculate monthly index figures. When these were not
available, figures were interpolated. The latter four months of 1984
and the first two months of 1985 were estimated based upon a 36%
annual inflation rate calculated by sources at a major industrial
country embassy in Santo Domingo. (The inflation index which was
constructed is included in Table A-2.)
The statistical procedure used was designed to test the effects
of the loan program upon participating firms. For this purpose, a
"before" and "after" approach was undertaken in which economic data on
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each firm at the time of disbursement of the first loan were compared
with the same variables at the time of disbursement of the ninth loan.
Normally the former occurred in early 1983 while the latter occurred
in late 1984 to early 1985. Comparison of means from this type of
"paired" sample is a standard statistical technique. The nul l
hypothesis is that the two means are not statistically different, or
that their difference is zero. The alternate hypothesis in each case
is 'that the mean has changed, and, where hypothesized a priori,
changed in the expected direction. Each of the variables reported in
pesos was deflated prior to being tested.
The hypothesis that ADEMI loans over the period were associated
with a change in the structure of the average firm involving more
skilled labor was validated in two separate tests. First, the average
wage, in 1982 pesos, rose as expected, showing a t-statistic
significant at 95% levels under a one-tailed test (1.857). Second,
sales per worker among (skilled plus unskilled) rose significantly, as
expected, at 95% levels under a one-tailed t-test (1.730). This result
was obtained despite the recessionary impact upon inventories which
might have been expected to cause sales per worker to remain stagnant.
(The ideal ratio would have been output per worker, or labor
productivity. However, this could not be derived, since data on
inventories were not compiled by ADEMI until recently.)
These results, taken together, indicate that the firms' expansion
under the ADEMI program required hiring more skilled laborers, lending
support to several of the hypotheses put forward in previous sections.
In contrast, the capital-labor ratio showed no significant change,
lending support to the finding that this measure may be misleading.
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(Recall that capital reported has not been depreciated, while labor
has not been classified into skilled and unskilled components.)
Wage payrolls per unit of capital rose significantly, however,
with a t-statistic of 1.960, justifying in yet a third manner the
hypothesis that firms will use more skilled labor with respect to
capital. Sales per unit of capital did not change significantly; this
result is not unexpected, however, since under the skilled labor
hypothesis, owners will have had to hire workers at higher wages in
order to increase sales.
Finally, real values of capital, wage payrolls, sales and
materials usage all rose in real terms along with the real value of
debt of the 41 firms, as expected.
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STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT OF A MICROFIRM
"D I t I
"Days of Struggle" - ;'
CTAC IT STAGE III
StabilizAtion Expansion
LABOR.
REQUIREMENTS
.nonrenumerated
faMily labor
.begins to hire apprentices
at below minimum wage
.hiring-firing "technique"
adopted as firm increase
workforce
.hiring-firing "technique"
discontinued
.increased rate of accumulation
of capital equipment
.increases in labor productivity
through hiring more skilled workers
________________________________________________ 
I
INPUT
SUPPLIES
.small informal-sector
retail firms
.larger wholesale suppliers
.imported inputs
OUTPUT .individual customers
DEMAND
.street vendors
(low icome groups) First "penetration"
.medium-sized stores "tiendas"
(lower to middle income groups)
Second "penetration"
"boutiaues"
(upper income groups)
EFFECTS OF
CREDIT PROGRAM .gives "extra" income
needed to beqin buying
from wholesale suppliers
.used for personal family
consumption
.invested in hiring workers
and buying raw materials
.serves as contact for new
customers
used for salaries to retain skilled
workers
.used for marketing product
___________________________________________________I
-4
TABLE A-1
MICROENTERPRISES OF THE FEASIBILITY STUDY* AND
Characteri sti cs
SAMPLE OF ADEMI FIRMS COMPARED.
ADEMI Clients
Average age of owner
Has other sources of income
Has tenure
Has license to operate
(patente)
Average number of employees
(includes owner)
Study
N=200
40
11%
34%
12.5%
2.6
Interviewed**
*Gross (1980)
**When they made first contact with ADEMI
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N=24
37
22%
40%
31%
5.8
TABLE A-2
MONTHLY INFLATION INDEX
*estimated based upon 36% annual inflation rate calculated by
industrial country embassy in Santo Domingo.
**i nterpol ated
@ calculated from IMF/IFS data
***quarterly figures
sources at a major
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UN Bull. of Stats. IMF/IFS
(1970: 12 = 100) (1980: 12 100)
1982:12 153.5 115.8***
1 153.0
2 152.3
3 151.0 119.4***
4 151.4
5 152.3
6 152.3 119.2
7 153.0
8 155.0
9 154.7 121.0***
10 157.4
11 159.7**
12 162.0** 125.4
1984: 1 164.4 131.5**
2 171.4 137.1
3 170.1 136.1
4 173.9 134.9***
5 181.5@**
6 189.5@ 151.6
7 193.8@ 155.0
8 197.3@ 157.8
9 202.8*
10 208.5*
11 214.3*
12 220.3*
1985: 1 226.5*
2 232.8*
TABLE A-3
SIGNIFICANCE TESTS
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Variable Expected Sign of t- Significance Level
(monthly figures) Change statistic
Change in Average Reaj Wage >'0 1.857 95%
Change in Sales Per Average
Worker (skilled plus unskilled) >0 1.730 95%
Change in Capital-Labor Ratio ? -1.172 insignificant
Change in Wage Payrolls Per Uni t >0 1,960 95%
of Capital
Change in Sales Per Unit of ? 1.115 insignificant
Capital
Change in Real Value of Capital 20 2,871 99%
Change in Real Wage Payrolls 0 3.83 99%
Change in Real Sales 20 3.445 99%
Change in Materials Consumption 0 3.471 99%
Change in Real Loan Value .0 9.499 99%
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